In a much anticipated filing with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in State of Nevada, et a. v. United States Department of Labor, et al, the United States Department of Labor has made clear that it is not defending the Obama Administration’s overtime rule that would more than double the threshold for employees to qualify for most overtime exemptions. However, the Department has taken up the appeal filed by the previous Administration to reverse the preliminary injunction issued blocking implementation of the rule, requesting that the Court overturn as erroneous the Eastern District of Texas’ finding, and reaffirm the Department’s authority to establish a salary level test. And the Department has requested that the Court not address the validity of the specific salary level set by the 2016 final rule because the Department intends to revisit the salary level threshold through new rulemaking.

The litigation stems from action taken by the Department in May 2016 to issue a final rule that would have increased the minimum salary threshold for most overtime exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) from $23,660 per year to $47,476 per year. The rule was scheduled to become effective on December 1, 2016, but a federal judge issued a temporary injunction blocking its implementation just days beforehand.

Section 13(a) of the FLSA exempts from the Act’s minimum wage and overtime pay requirements “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional [(“EAP”)] capacity * * * [specifically providing,] as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). To be subject to this exemption, a worker must (1) be paid on a salary basis; (2) earn a specified salary level; and (3) satisfy a duties test.  In enjoining the 2016 rule, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reasoned that the salary-level component of this three-part test is unlawful, concluding that “Congress defined the EAP exemption with regard to duties, which does not include a minimum salary level,” and that the statute “does not grant the Department the authority to utilize a salary-level test.”

In seeking reversal of the preliminary injunction, the Department has argued that the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the claim that the salary-level test is unlawful in Wirtz v. Mississippi Publishers Corp. In Wirtz, the Court reasoned that “[t]he statute gives the Secretary broad latitude to ‘define and delimit’ the meaning of the term ‘bona fide executive * * * capacity,” and he rejected the contention that “the minimum salary requirement is arbitrary or capricious.”  Further, the Department argues that every circuit to consider the issue has upheld the salary-level test as a permissible component of the EAP regulations.

By many accounts, the Department’s recently-appointed Labor Secretary, Alexander Acosta, has made clear that he does not think the salary level should be at $47,476 per year, but rather set at a more reasonable level between $30,000 and $35,000 per year. While Secretary Acosta may disagree with the salary level of the 2016 rule, the Department’s brief seems to make clear that he wants to ensure that he has the authority to set any salary threshold.

In issuing the preliminary injunction, the District Court did not address the validity of the salary level threshold set by the 2016 rule. Because the injunction rested on the legal conclusion that the Department lacks authority to set a salary level, it may be reversed on the ground that the legal ruling was erroneous. As a result, by requesting that the Fifth Circuit not address the validity of the salary level set by the 2016 rule, should the Court reverse the preliminary injunction without ruling on the salary level’s validity, it is unclear whether the 2016 rule will immediately go into effect pending new rulemaking. Employers need to stay tuned.

Since 2000, the number of wage and hour cases filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) has increased by more than 450 percent, with the vast majority of those cases being filed as putative collective actions.  Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), employees may pursue FLSA claims on behalf of “themselves and other employees similarly situated,” provided that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”  Despite the prevalence of FLSA collective actions, the legal implications and consequences of being a “party plaintiff” in such an action continue to be addressed.  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently examined this issue, in an opinion that may prove useful to defendants seeking to obtain discovery from all opt-in plaintiffs in a putative collective action.

In Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. et al., the named plaintiff filed a putative collective action alleging defendants violated the FLSA by failing to properly pay employees for work performed during meal breaks.  The district court dismissed the collective action allegations based on a related case that had previously been decided, and dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to re-filing individual actions.  After the named plaintiff subsequently settled his individual claim, three opt-in plaintiffs sought to appeal the district court’s decision.

The Third Circuit held the opt-in plaintiffs lacked the right to appeal, because they were no longer “parties” after the collective action claims were dismissed. The opt-in plaintiffs retained the right to pursue their own individual claims, but they had no right to pursue an appeal from the named plaintiff’s individual final judgment.  The court held that, “[b]y consenting to join Halle’s collective action, these opt-in plaintiffs ceded to Halle the ability to act on their behalf in all matters, including the ability to pursue this appeal.”

In reaching this decision, the Third Circuit engaged in an extensive analysis of the “fundamental question arising from the procedural history of this case: just what is a ‘collective action’ under the FLSA?” Unlike a class action brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, where all putative class members are bound by the court’s ruling unless they affirmatively “opt out” of the case, “the existence of a collective action depends upon the affirmative participation of opt-in plaintiffs.”  As the Third Circuit noted, “[t]his difference means that every plaintiff who opts in to a collective action has party status, whereas unnamed class members in Rule 23 class actions do not,” prompting “the as-yet unanswered question of what ‘party status’ means in a collective action.”

The court’s analysis of this issue, while tangential to Halle’s holding, highlights the tension inherent in the language of FLSA § 216(b), which, according to the Third Circuit, “raises more questions than it provides answers.  While the first sentence [of § 216(b)] sounds in representational terms (to proceed ‘in behalf of’ others ‘similarly situated’), the second sentence refers to those who file consents as ‘party plaintiffs,’ seeming to imply that all who affirmatively choose to become participants have an equal, individual stake in the proceeding.”  This tension is particularly significant with regard to defendants’ discovery rights in a collective action.

Under Rule 33 and Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of any court-imposed limits, a party may serve interrogatories and document requests “on any other party.”  Based on this language, and FLSA § 216(b)’s designation of individuals who opt in to a collective action as “party plaintiffs,” arguably a defendant in a collective action should be entitled to serve discovery requests on each individual who opts in to the litigation, unless the court orders otherwise.  Despite this fact, the Third Circuit noted that, “[f]requently,” discovery in collective actions “focuses on the named plaintiffs and a subset of the collective group,” a limitation that may hinder defendants’ ability to present individualized defenses that may not be applicable to all opt-in plaintiffs.

While the Third Circuit did not fully resolve the question of what it means to be a “party plaintiff,” two aspects of the Halle decision may prove helpful to defendants seeking to assert their right to obtain discovery from all opt-in plaintiffs in a collective action.  First, as noted above, the Third Circuit emphasized that each opt-in plaintiff “has party status.”  This language, when read in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the scope of discovery, should support defendants’ right to seek discovery from “any other party,” including all opt-in plaintiffs.

Second, in holding that the opt-in plaintiffs had no right to appeal a final judgment involving the named plaintiff, the court emphasized the importance of “the language of their opt-in consent forms, which handed over all litigation authority to named plaintiff.” The Third Circuit noted that courts often rely on the language of the opt-in consent form “to determine which rights opt-in plaintiffs delegated to the named plaintiffs.”  Based on this guidance, defendants may wish to propose including language in the opt-in consent form stating that individuals who join the collective action may be required to provide documents and information, sit for depositions, and/or testify at trial.  Such language may help demonstrate that the opt-in plaintiffs were meant to be treated as active parties to the litigation, with the same rights and obligations as named plaintiffs.

While a court may ultimately exercise its discretion to impose limits on the scope of discovery, particularly in collective actions with a large putative class, the Third Circuit’s analysis in Halle may prove useful to defendants seeking support for their argument that they should be entitled to obtain discovery from each opt-in plaintiff.

A federal district court in California has weighed in on the question of whether student-athletes are employees for the purposes of minimum wage and overtime laws. And, like the courts before it, it has rejected that notion.

In Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-cv-05487-RS (N.D. Ca. April 25, 2017), the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has joined the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts in holding that athletes are not employees entitled to minimum wage and overtime time pay.

In Dawson, a former college football player for the University of Southern California filed a putative class action against the NCAA and the associated conference, claiming he was denied full pay for all hours worked, including overtime. Rather than applying the four factor “economic reality” test that the Ninth Circuit has adopted, the district court focused on the “true nature of the relationship.” Borrowing from the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016), the court concluded that “student athletic ‘play’ is not ‘work,’ at least as that term is used in the FLSA.”

The court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the situation differed from Berger because the students in that case were track and field athletes, while the Dawson athletes played Division I football, which generates massive revenue for schools. The court noted that Plaintiff cited no authority to support this distinction.

The court also relied on the U.S. Department of Labor’s Field Operations Handbook, which indicates that students who participate in extracurricular activities generally are not employees of the school, distinguishing them from work-study students who typically are considered employees. The court drew a distinction between sports and work-study programs, labelling the latter as programs that benefit the school. Conversely, the court felt that football exists for the benefit of the student and only in limited circumstances, for the benefit of the school.

Thus, one federal court in California has joined the parade of courts that have rejected the concept of student athletes being employees of the schools where they are engaged in sports. The issue is likely to be appealed to the Ninth Circuit. And only time will tell whether the Ninth Circuit will confirm this result or whether it will conclude that student-athletes in fact are employees.

Claims that employees have been misclassified as independent contractors remain a focus for private plaintiffs and government agencies. Contracts that exert control over the business of another company may be a particularly fertile source of misclassification claims by plaintiffs seeking unpaid wages.

Two recent suits arising from franchise agreements with Jani-King, described by the Third Circuit as “the world’s largest commercial cleaning franchisor,” demonstrate the potential liability that can arise under these circumstances.

Wage Hour Division Sues Based on Misclassification of Franchisees

Last week, the Department of Labor filed suit claiming that franchisees of Jani-King of Oklahoma Inc. are actually employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The DOL alleges that the franchisees typically have no employees of their own, but rather are individual who are required to pay Jani-King a franchise fee, royalties, and other payments to receive cleaning assignments.

The suit contends that Jani-King, among other things, sets customer cleaning rates; negotiates with customers over the cleaning contracts under which franchisees work; reassigns cleaning contracts from one franchise to another; handles “all aspects of how and whether cleaners are paid for the work they perform;” and collects payments from customers.

Notably, the only claim in the DOL’s Complaint is for an injunction requiring Jani-King to begin keeping records of the wages and hours its alleged employees. The fact that the DOL has chosen to pursue injunctive relief in the absence of any other remedy suggests a strong interest in the principles at issue in the case.

Third Circuit Affirms Class Certification Based on Franchise Agreement & Manuals

The DOL suit was preceded by a September 21, 2016, decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  That decision upheld a district court’s order certifying a Rule 23 class action of approximately 300 Philadelphia-area franchisees who claim to be Jani-King employees.

In determining whether an employee has been misclassified as an independent contractor under Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit stated that “the paramount factor is the right to control the manner in which the work is accomplished.”

The District Court’s opinion had pointed to specific provisions in the Jani-King franchise agreement, policy manual and training manual through which Jani-King (among other things) mandated how often a franchisee communicated with customers and dictated how franchisees addressed customer complaints, maintained their records and solicited business.

The District Court stated that “[t]hose documents also demonstrated that Jani-King controlled the franchisees’ work assignments, has the right to inspect the franchisees work, and has the ability to change the policies and procedures as it sees fit.”

Because the Jani-King franchise agreement, policies manual, and training manual were common to the class, they supported the conclusion that common issues would predominate in misclassification cases by franchisees. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s class certification order.  The plaintiffs will therefore be able to pursue class claims against Jani-King under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

The sometimes-rigid nature of franchise relationships can not only be evidence of the level of control characteristic of an employment relationship, but can also provide a basis for arguing that claims should joined in a Rule 23 class action. Companies, therefore, should consider whether the controls imposed by franchise agreements (or any other contracts) are justified by their potential to create unwanted employment relationships.

US Supreme CourtOn March 22, 2016, the United States Supreme Court issued its much anticipated decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, a donning and doffing case in which a class of employees had been awarded $2.9 million following a 2011 jury trial that relied on statistical evidence. (A subsequent liquidated damages award brought the total to $5.8 million.)

In a 6-2 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed that award.  While the Supreme Court’s decision may not have been the outcome many were expecting, the Court did not issue a broad ruling regarding the use of statistical evidence in class actions, and the decision may prove to have limited application.

In 2007, Tyson Foods employees at a meat processing facility in Iowa filed suit under both state law and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that they were not paid overtime for the time spent donning and doffing protective gear.  Because Tyson Foods did not have records of the amount of time employees actually spent in those activities, employees’ filled the “evidentiary gap” at through the presentation of representative evidence. This included not only employee testimony and video recordings, but, most importantly, an expert study showing the average time employees spent in such activities as observed by the expert.

In seeking to reverse the jury award, Tyson Foods argued to both the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court that the amount of time spent donning and doffing varied from person to person – and that some persons did not work sufficient time to be entitled to overtime in any event – such that individualized issues predominated over common ones. And Tyson Foods argued that the use of statistical evidence presented it from presenting individualized defenses.

In making these and other arguments, Tyson Foods sought a broad ruling prohibiting the use of statistical evidence in class actions. The Supreme Court rejected that request, concluding that such a rule would “reach too far.” And it explained that its landmark 2011 Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision “does not stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing class-wide liability.”

Instead, the Supreme Court held that a “representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not on the form a proceeding takes — be it a class or individual action — but on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action.” It further explained, “Whether and when statistical evidence can be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the evidence is being introduced and on ‘the elements of the underlying cause of action’ . . . .”

Under the facts presented to it, the Supreme Court  concluded that statistics could be used to infer the amount of time Tyson Foods employees spent donning and doffing because those statistics could have been used in individual suits by the employees.

Importantly, in reaching its conclusion, just as it declined to issue a blanket rule forbidding the use of statistical evidence, the Court also declined to issue a broad rule affirming the use of statistical evidence in all class actions.

The Court noted that its opinion “is not to say that all inferences drawn from representative evidence in an FLSA case are ‘just and reasonable.’ . . . . Representative evidence that is statistically inadequate or based on implausible assumptions could not lead to a fair or accurate estimate of the uncompensated hours an employee has worked.”  In other words, a defendant can challenge an expert’s methodology, which Tyson Foods did not do.

The Court concluded its discussion of representative evidence by declining to issue any broad rule: “The Court reiterates that, while petitioner, respondents, or their respective amici may urge adoption of broad and categorical rules governing the use of representative and statistical evidence in class actions, this case provides no occasion to do so. Whether a representative sample may be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of action. In FLSA actions, inferring the hours an employee has worked from a study such as [the expert’s] has been permitted by the Court so long as the study is otherwise admissible. . . . The fairness and utility of statistical methods in contexts other than those presented here will depend on facts and circumstances particular to those cases.”

While the decision is a victory for Tyson Foods employees, it is those sentences quoted directly above that will likely limit the decision from having widespread application.  The decision will no doubt be cited by plaintiffs’ counsel in class and collective actions to support their efforts to use statistical evidence to establish both liability and damages in their cases, even where there are individuals who have not been harmed. And defense counsel in those cases will just as certainly point to language in the decision that would indicate that it is a narrow ruling limited to its facts.

Not unimportantly, one issue left unaddressed by the Court pertains to Tysons Foods’ argument that uninjured class members should not recover damages.  The Court declined to address that issue, holding that that question was not fairly presented to it in this case because the damages award has not yet been distributed and  the record does not indicate how it will be done. Accordingly, Tyson Foods may raise a challenge to the allocation method when the case returns to the trial court for distribution of the award to address persons who were not injured.

The top story on Employment Law This Week – Epstein Becker Green’s new video program – is the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division’s new interpretation of joint employment.

The federal Wage and Hour Division issued an Administrator’s Interpretation with new guidelines for joint employers under the FLSA and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. The Division makes it clear that it believes employers are regularly part of joint employment relationships with their vendors and business partners. If an employee files a claim or lawsuit and a joint-employment relationship is found, both employers can be found liable for violations. Michael Thompson, co-editor of this blog, explains it more in depth on the show.

View the episode below or read more about this decision in an earlier blog post.

 

Conference room behind blindsIn a split decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to adopt a bright-line rule to assess whether a managerial employee has filed a complaint for the purposes of § 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the statute’s anti-retaliation provision.  The decision, Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, appears to highlight a disagreement among the Circuits.

At least four Circuit Courts – the First, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth – have adopted a manager-specific legal standard:  in order to engage in protected activity under § 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to file) an action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or otherwise engage in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA.  Declining to adopt such a standard, the Ninth Circuit has opted to follow a generalized “fair notice” standard, ruling that a complaining employee’s position as a manager is only one contextual element for a fact-finder to consider.

In Rosenfield, a former Director of Human Resources alleged that her employer fired her for complaining to other managers and executives about alleged FLSA violations.  The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether managerial employees must step outside of their roles representing the company in order to be considered to have engaged in protected activity under § 215(a)(3), by either filing (or threatening to file) an action adverse to the employer, actively assisting other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or otherwise engaging in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA.  In addition to considering arguments presented by the parties, the Ninth Circuit solicited the views of the Department of Labor and the Equal Opportunity Commission.

In Rosenfield, both the majority and dissent agreed that managers are necessarily in a different position vis-à-vis the employer than are rank-and-file employees because their employer expects them to voice work-related concerns and to suggest changes in policy.  The majority went so far as to acknowledge that while an employer “almost certainly” would understand a report made by an entry-level employee that someone is underpaid in violation of the FLSA as a “complaint,” a reasonable employer would not necessarily recognize as a “complaint” an identical report made by a manager tasked with ensuring the company’s compliance with the FLSA.  Rather, the employer would understand the manager to be simply carrying out his or her duties.

While other Circuits have adopted a manager-specific legal standard that requires a managerial employee to step out of his or her role of representing the company by becoming adverse to his or her employer in some way in order to file a “complaint” under § 215(a)(3), the Ninth Circuit has concluded that  such a bright-line rule is unnecessary.  Instead, it concluded that the “fair notice” test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 2011 decision provides adequate guidance for considering an employee’s status as a “manager” as one of several important factors.  In addition, the Ninth Circuit held that a narrower rule fails to account for varying levels of managers.  Specifically, “[a] different perspective on fair notice may apply as between a first level manager who is responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations and a high-level manager who is responsible for insuring the company’s compliance with the FLSA.  Refining the general rule to focus on only one specific factual element may obscure important nuances.”

Applying the fair notice test to the facts, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of GlobalTranz and found that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s advocacy reached the requisite degree of formality to constitute protected activity under § 215(a)(3).

While the Supreme Court may eventually weigh in on the split between the Circuits, it remains as important as ever for employers in all Circuits to take all reports of FLSA violations seriously, regardless of whether they are made by managerial or non-managerial employees.

As we mentioned earlier this week, I was recently interviewed on our firm’s new video program, Employment Law This Week.  The show has now released “bonus footage” from that episode – see below.

I elaborate on some of the reasons behind this year’s sharp increase in federal wage-and-hour suits: worker-friendly rules, increased publicity around minimum wage and overtime issues, and the difficulties of applying an outdated law to today’s “gig” economy.

PostThe Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently joined the chorus of Circuits adopting the pro-employer “predominant benefit test” when weighing the compensability of meal periods under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  As a result, the Ninth Circuit is the lone Circuit to apply a different standard, opting to follow the U.S. Department of Labor regulations providing that an “employee must be completely relieved from duty” in order for a meal period to be deemed bona fide and thus not compensable.

In Babcock v. Butler County, a putative class action lawsuit, employees at the Butler County prison alleged that their employer required them to abide by certain restrictions beneficial to the employer during their one-hour meal periods, and that they were not paid for 15 minutes of the one-hour break, in violation of the FLSA. The issue before the Third Circuit was whether the 15 minutes was compensable under the FLSA.  The Third Circuit covers the States of Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

While there is no provision of the FLSA that directly addresses the issue, the regulations provide that bona fide meal periods are not work time, and that employees “must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals … [and that an] employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating.”  The courts, however, have generally avoided a literal reading of the regulations. Indeed, despite the “completely relieved from duty” language followed by the Ninth Circuit, the other Circuits, now including the Third, have taken the position that a meal period is compensable if an employee is performing activities predominantly for the benefit of the employer. This approach is derived from Supreme Court precedent from 1944 holding that “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.” (Emphasis added.). As a result, the “predominant benefit test” is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry.

Although the Third Circuit decision in Babcock was split, on appeal the parties and the justices agreed that applying the “predominant benefit test” was appropriate.  In support of the argument that the meal period was spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer, the employees specifically claimed that, during the one-hour meal period, they were subject to the following restrictions: they were not permitted to leave the prison building (unless granted permission by the warden); they were required to remain in uniform; they were required to remain in close proximity to emergency response equipment; and they were required to respond to any emergencies.

While there were restrictions that clearly benefitted the employer, the District Court found, and the Third Circuit agreed, that the restrictions did not predominantly benefit the employer. Rather, under the totality of the circumstances, the employees enjoyed the predominant benefit of their uninterrupted hour-long meal period. Simply put, outside of the restrictions described above, the employees were free to comfortably and adequately spend their meal period how they wished, including eating away from their desks or seeking approval to leave the premises, without their time or attention devoted primarily to official responsibilities.  Although deemed a relevant, but not dispositive, factor, the Third Circuit noted that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement set forth the terms of the one-hour meal period, including that the fifteen minutes would be unpaid.

Until the Supreme Court weighs in on the split between the Circuits, employers located in those states covered by the Ninth Circuit – Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington – will need to ensure that employees are provided a “completely relieved from duty” meal period, or risk being in violation of the FLSA.  Employers located in any of the other states stand to benefit from the pro-employer “predominant benefit test,” which as evidenced by the decision in Babcock, permits employers to place some restrictions on employee meal periods, so long as the employees remain free to comfortably and adequately spend their meal period without primarily engaged in their official responsibilities.  Note, the First Circuit, covering the States of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, has not had an opportunity to establish a test to determine whether a meal period is compensable under the FLSA.  However, the District Court in Massachusetts has had three opportunities, and adopted the “predominant benefits test.”

The top story on Employment Law This Week – Epstein Becker Green’s new video program – is the record high for Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuits in 2015.

The number of federal wage-and-hour suits rose almost 8% this year. There are many reasons for the increase, including more worker-friendly rules and increased publicity around minimum wage and overtime issues. Some point to the difficulties of applying an outdated law to our modern day economy.

Jeff Ruzal, co-editor of this blog, is interviewed. Click below to view the episode.