Wage & Hour Defense Blog : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Epstein Becker Green Law Firm : DOL Enforcement, FLSA Coverage

By: Dean Silverberg, Evan Spelfogel, Peter Panken, Douglas Weiner and Donald Krueger

Reversing its prior stance, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposes to extend the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to domestic workers who provide in-home care services to the elderly and infirm. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend the Companionship and Live-In Worker Regulations. In 1974, when domestic service workers were first included in FLSA coverage, the DOL published regulations that provided an exemption for such “companions”, whether employed directly by the families of the elderly and infirm, or by a third party employer/staffing agency. Now, heeding calls from organized labor and certain members of Congress, the DOL is moving to close this “loophole.” See“Is the Department of Labor Considering a Revision to the Domestic Service Exemption for Home Health Care Aides?” .

Specifically, the proposed rule would eliminate the exemption for third-party employers, like service staffing agencies, even if the employee is jointly employed by the staffing agency and the family. The new proposal if implemented, would likely drive up costs for families who wish to care for their elderly and infirm at home.

The change would be particularly onerous for Home Health Agencies if it is deemed to be merely a correction of a “misinterpretation” and given retroactive effect. This could lead to claims of past liability for extra overtime compensation for Home Health Agencies that had relied on the Department of Labor’s prior interpretation. The DOL’s prior interpretation, exempting third party employers and staffing agencies from FLSA overtime requirements had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the Coke case.

The change in the federal DOL’s interpretation could also affect State Wage Hour Regulations (like New York). These provide favorable treatment for employers of employees who are exempt under the FLSA.

The public has been invited to comment on the proposed new rule. Potentially adversely affected employers may use the public comment period to point out the impropriety of the proposed change after thirty five years of consistent industry wide application of the current rule. Employers might also point out that an unintended effect of the changed rule may be to force the care of the elderly and infirm from their homes to an institutional setting, such as a nursing home or assisted care facility.

By:  Peter M. Panken, Michael S. Kun, Douglas Weiner and Larissa Lalor-Rosado

Misclassification of employees as exempt from overtime compensation has become a cottage industry for plaintiff’s lawyers and for the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) in the Obama years.  One of the most difficult issues is whether employees meet the so-called administrative exemption to the Wage Hour laws.  In Hines v. State Room, the United States Circuit Court in New England offered some clarity and help to beleaguered employers holding that former banquet sales managers were exempt from overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

The FLSA, requires overtime pay at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a seven day period unless the employee is exempt. The three pronged test for exemption for administrative employees is whether the employee is (1) salaried (paid a regular amount of at least $455 for all hours worked in a workweek); (2) the employee’s primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) the employee’s primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.

Plaintiffs were banquet sales managers whose job included seeking potential customers for events at the employer, developing the elements of the party or other event and submitting the proposed contract terms for approval by senior officials of the Banquet Halls.

The Court found that Plaintiffs met the first two prongs for exemption: Plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis, and their work was primarily administrative because it was ancillary to the employer’s actual business of providing banquet services.

Plaintiffs claimed that they did not meet the third prong for exemption because they lacked the authority to make any decisions of financial consequence, supervisory authority or policy-making authority.

The Court found that while the plaintiffs’ discretion in matters having significant financial impact was subject to managerial approval, such restrictions did not detract from the judgment exercised in developing a proposal for the client. Plaintiffs’ duties included maintaining primary contact with a client, tailoring an event to their needs, and overseeing the event through to execution. The Court ruled that plaintiffs exercised adequate discretion as sales people to be designated as exempt.

Other Factors Considered for Exemption

The preamble to the current DOL regulations identifies a host of factors that courts have found sufficient to demonstrate that employees exercise independent judgment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22144. Such factors include:

·                     the ability to exercise discretion and independent judgment,

·                     freedom from direct supervision,

·                     personnel responsibilities,

·                     trouble-shooting or problem-solving activities on behalf of management,

·                     use of personalized communication techniques,

·                     authority to handle atypical or unusual situations,

·                     responsibility for assessing customer needs, primary contact to public or customers on behalf of the employer, the duty to anticipate competitive products or services and distinguish them from competitor’s products or services,

·                     advertising or promotion work, and coordination of departments, requirements or other activities for or on behalf of employer or employer’s clients or customers.

Unfortunately these factors are very fact intensive and do not provide a bright line test for exemption, But the Hines case does offer some useful precedent and guidance for employers. In any event, care must be taken to be sure that the law in a particular state or in a particular circuit does not impose a stricter limitation on the discretion and independent judgment issue.

Take-Away

An employer may retain the right to review an employee’s ability to create financial and contractual obligations and still properly classify the employee as exempt. Requiring managerial approval for these purposes does not necessarily detract from the judgment exercised by the employee at arriving at the proposal in the first place. In addition, as set forth above, there are numerous other factors that courts can consider in determining whether an employee should be designated as exempt.

By:  Michael Thompson

In Ibanez v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued the latest ruling in the ongoing dispute over whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 

The plaintiff in Ibanez was a former sales representative for Abbott.  Among other things, the plaintiff helped create “business plans which tracked doctors by market share and potential.”  The plaintiff also developed “game plan[s] or strateg[ies] for individual calls with physicians.”  Thus, the District Court ruled that the plaintiff exercised significant independent discretion, and therefore fell within the Administrative exemption of the FLSA. 

This dispute over the exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representatives has arisen as plaintiffs have argued with increasing frequency that the representatives do not fall under the Outside Sales exemption.  This argument is based on the fact that these sales representatives do not “close” any sales.  Rather, a sale is closed outside the presence of a sales representative (when a patient fills a prescription at a pharmacy). Accordingly, plaintiffs contend, the Outside Sales exemption is inapplicable to these sales representatives and they are therefore entitled to overtime.

The battle lines in this dispute over the status of pharmaceutical sales representatives have been drawn around the rulings of three federal circuit courts: the Ninth Circuit, which has applied the Outside Sales exemption to these sales representatives; the Third Circuit, which has applied the Administrative exemption to these sales representatives; and the Second Circuit, which has declined to apply either exemption, found sales representatives to be non-exempt and therefore required employers to pay overtime compensation.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., for example, rejected the argument that pharmaceutical sales representatives did not qualify for the Outside Sales exemption. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the sales representatives do not “close” direct sales.  However, the Court noted that the sales representatives were prohibited by law from making direct sales.  The Ninth Circuit accordingly held that, in the context of the industry, “common sense” showed that the pharmaceutical sales representatives fell within the terms of the Outside Sales exemption.

Conversely, in In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Novartis sales representatives did not meet the requirements of the Outside Sales exemption because they did not “make sales.”  

The Second Circuit then evaluated whether the sales representatives had enough independent discretion to qualify for the Administrative exemption.  It was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to visit a given physician a certain number of times.  It was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to promote a given drug a certain number of times, and it was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to hold at least a certain number of promotional events per trimester.  Thus, the Second Circuit accepted the sales representatives claim that she did “low-level discretionless marketing work” and did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment to satisfy the Administrative exemption

Finally, in Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that thus it was unnecessary to consider the Outside Sales Exemption because the sales representatives in that case satisfied the FLSA’s Administrative exemption.  The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff developed her own strategic plan to achieve higher sales.  The plaintiff herself prioritized her responsibilities in a manner that maximized business results. Indeed, the plaintiff admitted that “[i]t was really up to [her] to run the territory the way [she] wanted to.”  The Third Circuit concluded that, by formulating and implementing the strategies for her territory, the plaintiff exercised sufficient independent discretion to qualify for the Administrative exemption

Like the plaintiff in the Johnson & Johnson case, the plaintiff in Ibanez exercised the discretion to develop his own business plans and thus stood in contrast to the plaintiff in the Novartis case.  Indeed, the District Court cited to twelve admissions made by the plaintiff regarding his job duties.  Seven of those admissions related to plaintiff developing various strategic plans (e.g. business plans, call plans, focus plans, etc.).

Thus, Ibanez further demonstratesthat the key to establishing the Administrative exemption for pharmaceutical sales representatives is the exercise discretion in formulating business strategies. Accordingly, sales representatives who help to create their own business plans have a strong argument for exempt status, while sales representatives who carry out strategies given to them have a more difficult argument.

By:      David Garland and Douglas Weiner

In February 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave a resounding victory to employers in the pharmaceutical industry by finding that pharmaceutical sales representatives are covered by the outside sales exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, No. 10-15257 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011). Plaintiffs, and the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) in an amicus brief, had argued the exemption did not apply because sales reps are prohibited from making the final sale. Prescription medicine in the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry can only be sold to the ultimate consumer with the authorization of a licensed physician. Sales reps use their “selling skills” to persuade doctors to prescribe their employer’s products when the doctor’s patients have a medical need for them. Sales reps do not transfer title to the medicine themselves.

Previously the Second Circuit, in In Re Novartis, took a contrary view and adopted the Secretary of Labor’s position that the outside sales exemption did not apply to pharmaceutical sales representatives specifically because they were prohibited by regulation from making direct sales. The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ and DOL’s “rigid, formalistic interpretation” of the FLSA’s definition of “sale,” which provides that “Sale” … includes any “sale … or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. 203(k). Because of the uncertainty in this unsettled area of law, both the employee plaintiffs and the employer asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Pertinent to the aggressive approach the DOL has recently taken in submitting unsolicited amicus briefs in significant cases, another issue the Supreme Court may review is the degree of deference, if any, the court owes to an amicus brief submitted by the DOL. Again in stark contrast, the Second Circuit gave the DOL’s amicus brief “controlling deference” to interpret the DOL’s own regulations while the Ninth Circuit gave the DOL’s amicus brief “no deference” finding it was a departure from established industry norm that the DOL used to short-cut the public notice – and – comment rule making procedures.       

It would be a most welcome development for the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit and resolve this dramatic split in the circuit courts. However, even if the Second Circuit’s view of the “outside salesman” exemption is upheld, there are circumstances when sales reps may be exempt by virtue of the administrative exemption. Employers need clarity to structure employment practices without the ever-present threat of class action litigation.

By Douglas Weiner and Meg Thering

On October 20, 2011, the Computer Professionals Update Act (“the CPU Act”) – one of the first potential pieces of good news for employers this year – was introduced in the U.S. Senate.  If passed, the CPU act would expand the computer employee exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  S. 1747. 

Unlike much of the other legislation affecting employers that has been proposed or passed this year, the CPU Act would make business easier for employers and decrease the risk of employee misclassification lawsuits.  If the proposed legislation passes, employers would be able to classify more employees as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.  This would be a welcome change from the persistent drum beat of enhanced enforcement initiatives announced by government agencies and upticks in class and collective actions this year.

The computer employee exemption currently is limited to employees who earn at least $27.63 an hour and work as computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, or other similar positions.  Employees are exempt if their primary duties consist of: (1) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software or system functional specifications; (2) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (3) the design, documentation, testing, creation or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (4) a combination of such duties.  29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17); 541 C.F.R. § 400; U.S. Department of Labor Fact Sheet #17E.  In contrast, employees whose work consists of repairing or manufacturing computer equipment are not exempt. 541 C.F.R. § 401; U.S. Department of Labor Fact Sheet #17E.

The CPU Act would broaden the exemption to include any employee who works in a “computer or information technology occupation (including but not limited to, work related to computers, information systems, components, networks, software, hardware, databases, security, internet, intranet, or websites) as an analyst, programmer, engineer, designer, developer, administrator, or other similarly skilled worker.”  The primary duties for the exemption to apply would also be broader under the CPU Act, which would consider employees exempt if their primary duties are: (1) “the application of systems, network or database analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine or modify hardware, software, network, database, or system functional specifications;” or (2) “the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, securing, configuration, integration, debugging, modification of computer or information technology, or enabling continuity of systems and applications.”  Employees who perform a combination of these duties would still be considered exempt.  Also, employees who are “directing the work of individuals performing duties described [above], including training such individuals or leading teams performing such duties” would be considered exempt.  S. 1747. 

By Evan J. Spelfogel

For several years, employers’ counsel have moved to block the combining of state wage and overtime claims with federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims, arguing that Rule 23 opt-out class actions were inherently inconsistent with FLSA collective opt-in actions. For support, they cited to the decision of the Third Circuit in De Asencio vs. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F. 3d 301 (3^rd Cir. 2003) reversing a district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction because of the inordinate size of the state-law class, the different terms of proof required by the implied contract state-law claims, and the general federal interest in opt-in wage actions. Since De Asencio, numerous district courts in the Third Circuit have dismissed state law wage claims that paralleled FLSA claims because of the “inherent incompatability” between opt-in collective actions and opt-out class actions. 

On September 26, 2011, the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals approved the combining of state law Rule 23 opt-out class wage claims with an FLSA opt-in collective action. Salim Shahriar, et al. vs. Smith & Wollensky Group, Inc. d/b/a Park Avenue Restaurant, et al., __________ F. 3d _________ (2^nd Cir. No. 10-1884). The Court noted that nothing in the FLSA statutory language or legislative history precluded joint prosecution of FLSA and state law wage claims in the same federal action. The U.S. Department of Labor weighed in with an amicus brief stating that the Restaurant had misinterpreted the FLSA, urging the court to reject any attempt to use the FLSA to bar certification of a class action of state law wage claims in federal courts merely because a FLSA collective action was pending.

The Second Circuit in Smith & Wollensky approved and relied substantially upon the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Irvin vs. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632 F. 3d 971 (7^th Cir. 2011) holding that a district court had abused its discretion in denying Rule 23 class action certification of state claims merely because of the existence of a parallel FLSA collective action. The Seventh Circuit noted that neither the text of the FLSA nor the procedures established by that statute suggested that the FLSA was intended generally to oust other ordinary procedures used in federal courts, or that class actions in particular could not be combined with an FLSA proceeding. 

The Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits also concluded that any alleged incompalability between the FLSA and Federal Rule 23 was insufficient to deny supplemental jurisdiction. See, Wang vs. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F. 3d 743 (9^th Cir. 2010) (vacated and remanded in light of Walmart, 564 U.S. _____, 10/3/11); and Lindsay vs. Government Employees Insurance Co., 448 F. 3d 416 (DC Cir. 2006). In summary, these Circuits have held that, while there may in some cases be exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, the “conflict” between the opt-in procedure under the FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 was not a sufficient cause by itself to decline jurisdiction.   

Ultimately, the US Supreme Court may be called upon to review an apparent split in the Circuits on this issue. In the meantime, employers are urged to continue to raise the issue in courts that have not yet ruled, and to urge “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” for courts in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits to bar hybrid state Rule 23 opt-out claims from the federal processes. 

This might include, for example, the size of the putative opt-out Rule 23 class in the state law claims as compared with the number of opt-ins in the FLSA collective action. Hybrid collective and class actions typically arise where only a small number of potential opt-in plaintiffs under a FLSA claim actually opt-in, while there are hundreds and perhaps thousands of putative class members with potential state law claims. One purpose of Congress in enacting the FLSA opt-in provision, it may be argued, was to control the volume of litigation and ensure that absent individuals would not have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge. The opt-in mechanism under the FLSA limits FLSA claims to those affirmatively asserted by employees “in their own right” and frees employers from the burden of representative actions. Allowing a Rule 23 opt-out option to be combined in the same lawsuit with an opt-in FLSA option allows plaintiffs to evade the requirements of the FLSA by permitting litigation through a representative action and bringing unnamed plaintiffs into the lawsuit. See, e.g., Dell vs. Citizens Financial Group, Inc., Western District Pennsylvania No. 2:10-Civ-00320, 6/8/11.

By Michael Kun, Regina Musolino and Aaron Olsen

Since the Supreme Court’s historic ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, attorneys have debated the scope and impact of the decision.  Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ counsel have argued that the decision was limited to its facts, or to discrimination cases, or to cases involving nationwide claims.  And they have argued that Wal-Mart has no application whatsoever to wage-hour class actions and collective actions.  In only a few words, the Supreme Court may have answered some of these questions.

Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court quietly vacated a $7.7 million award in a wage-hour class action in Chinese Daily News v. Wang, remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Wal-Mart.  While the Supreme Court did not provide any further analysis or guidance, and while the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate ruling cannot be predicted, the vacation order alone would seem to undermine a few of the arguments that many plaintiffs’ counsel have been making since Wal-Mart was decided – particularly that Wal-Mart was limited to its facts and has no application to wage-hour matters.  Simply, if the Supreme Court believed Wal-Mart was not applicable to wage-hour claims, there would have been no reason to vacate Chinese Daily News. 

The history of the Chinese Daily News class action is a long and tortured one that most readers of this blog would have little interest in.  It is a hybrid class action alleging claims under both the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California state law for unpaid overtime wages, meal and rest break violations, wage statement violations and waiting time penalties as to approximately 300 employees working at a single facility.  A California district court certified a class under the FLSA, as well as under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).  The matter ultimately went to trial, where the class prevailed.  The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's decision to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), but declined to address whether certification was appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).   

Given no guidance from the Supreme Court, it would be pure speculation how the Ninth Circuit will ultimately rule.  However it rules, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand will have an enormous impact upon the defense of wage-hour actions throughout the country.  That impact could be short-lived, though.  However the Ninth Circuit rules, we should not be surprised to see one party seeking to take the ruling up to the Supreme Court.  And the Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit rulings in approximately 80% of the Ninth Circuit cases it hears.

By Amy Traub and Christina Fletcher

Once a settlement has been reached in an FLSA collective action, the defendant-employer typically wants that settlement to go into effect and end the case as soon as possible, so that the company can get past the myriad of distractions brought by the suit. However, as litigants increasingly are finding, the parties’ agreement to settle an FLSA collective action is nowhere near the end of the road, or the end of the case. There is a “judicial prohibition” against the unsupervised waiver or settlement of claims brought under the FLSA. Settlements must be “supervised” by the Department of Labor or a court, and gone are the days where the court would rubberstamp the parties’ FLSA collective action settlement agreement. Instead, courts nowadays are scrutinizing the settlement to ensure the “fairness” of the agreement.

A recent decision by District Judge Deborah K. Chasanow of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland describes the information that courts are requiring parties to provide in their settlement agreements and accompanying motions for approval of the settlement. In Lane v. Ko-Me, LLC, Judge Chasanow rejected the parties’ motion for approval of their FLSA settlement, finding the parties’ joint motion for approval to be “clearly deficient” in setting forth facts or arguments upon which the court could evaluate the fairness of the agreement.  The Lane decision is helpful in providing a roadmap as to what parties may want to consider including in their submissions to the court seeking approval of an FLSA collective action settlement:

• Provide a detailed description of the parties’ respective positions as to each issue so the court may assess whether there is, in fact, a bona fide dispute.  The Lane parties “simply listed the points of disagreement” they had regarding various issues, such as their dispute over whether the plaintiffs were properly classified as independent contractors and their disagreement regarding the amount of hours worked by the plaintiffs.  In the court’s view, this was not enough to allow the judge to evaluate the disputed issues resolved by the parties’ settlement.  For example, if an employee’s entitlement to overtime is in dispute, the employer should articulate the reasons for disputing the employee’s right to overtime, and the plaintiff should articulate the reasons justifying his/her entitlement to the disputed wages.

• Give the court sufficient data to allow it to assess the fairness of the settlement amount. In Lane, the judge rebuked the parties for only providing conclusory assertions that the proposed settlement fund of $90,000 represented the full amount due to the plaintiffs for all hours claimed to have been worked plus all liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Instead, the judge wanted concrete data from the parties to allow her to assess whether the $90,000 settlement would fairly compensate the plaintiffs – i.e., the number of hours they claimed to have worked, the rates of pay they were owed, and the liquidated damages to which they claimed to be entitled.

• Remind the plaintiffs’ counsel of their duty to prove to the court that their proposed fee award is reasonable. Courts are charged with independently assessing the reasonableness of the fee award proposed in an FLSA settlement. While the level of detail required may vary by district or judge, Judge Chasanow wanted the plaintiffs’ counsel to provide her with sufficient facts to allow her to evaluate the requested award of attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method, including declarations establishing the hours counsel had expended on the matter, broken down for each task, and demonstrating that their hourly rate was reasonable. Judge Chasanow also noted that it was imperative that the parties inform the court how the $90,000 proposed settlement award was to be apportioned between the plaintiffs and their counsel.

• Present the court with a strong argument that any confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement is reasonable. The settlement agreement at issue in the Lane case contained a “Covenant of Confidentiality”, which compelled the plaintiffs’ silence as to the terms of the agreement and the negotiations leading to the agreement. Expressing doubt about the inclusion of such a provision, Judge Chasanow explained that confidentiality provisions in an FLSA settlement agreement operate in contravention of the FLSA, and, therefore, any agreement that contains such a provision must be rejected if it is unreasonable. The burden is on the parties to present arguments in support of their position that the proposed confidentiality provision is reasonable, enforceable, and should be approved by the court.

Following the steps outlined above when seeking court approval of an FLSA collective action may take more time and effort on the front-end, but may help smooth the way to getting the court’s approval and getting the case closed on the back-end.

By Kara M. Maciel

As Hurricane Irene is moving up the East Coast and threatening states from North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts, employers should refresh themselves on the wage and hour issues arising from the possibility of missed work days in the wake of the storm.

A few brief points that all employers should be mindful of under the FLSA:

• A non-exempt employee generally does not have to be paid for weather-related absences. An employer may allow (or require) non-exempt employees to use vacation or personal leave days for such absences. But, if the employer has a collective bargaining agreement or handbook policies, the employer may obligate itself to pay through such policies.
• An exempt employee generally must be paid for absences caused by office closures due to weather, if he/she performs work in that week. The Department of Labor has stated that an employer may not dock a salaried employee for full days when the business is closed because of weather. Partial day deductions for weather related absences are not permitted.
• If certain employees are required to be on-call (such as public safety, IT, or other essential personnel) during the storm, and the employee cannot use the time effectively for his or her own purpose, the on-call time is compensable and the employee must be paid. However, if the employee is simply at home and available to be reached by company officials, then the time is not working time and an employer does not have to pay for that time.

Policies and procedures to keep in place:

• Decide whether your company will offer “weather days” for non-exempt workers who are absent because of disasters.
• Ensure that your payroll systems are prepared for employees working from home, longer shifts, or not taking lunches.
• Decide whether employees absent because of weather will be allowed / required to use vacation or PTO time.
• Ensure safety of payroll records and ability to process payroll from alternate location if needed.

Natural disasters pose a myriad of employment and HR issues from wage-hour to FMLA leave and the WARN Act. The best protection is to have a plan in place in advance to ensure your employees are paid and well taken care of during a difficult time. Our reference tool contains answers to common questions, and while aimed at employers in the Gulf Coast, if you have operations anywhere along the East Coast, you should find it helpful.

I am pleased to report that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of our client, a bus company, in a case involving the motor carrier exemption.  The case is Walters v. American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc. (11th Cir., July 23, 2009).

 I first reported on this case and discussed the basics of the motor carrier exemption in a September 2008 post on the Florida Employment Law Blog.  My EBG colleague, Brian Molinari, recently summarized the Walters decision in a post on the Prima Facie Law Blog.

A quick refresher:  The motor carrier exemption is one of several exemptions from the Fair Labor Standards Act which generally requires employees engaged in commerce to be paid at least time and a half for the time worked above forty hours in one week. The motor carrier exemption provides:

The provisions of section 207 [maximum hours] of this title shall not apply with respect to. . . any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.”  29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). 

49 U.S.C. section 31502 grants “the Secretary of Transportation the power to regulate the qualifications and maximum number of hours for employees of motor carriers engaged in interstate transportation.”

The principal question in Walters was whether the ACLM's drivers, by driving trips to and from local airports and seaports, all of which are in Florida, were engaged in interstate transportation so as to trigger the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction over them.  If so, the motor carrier exemption would apply, and the drivers would not be entitled to overtime pay.

In answering that question in the affirmative, the court's opinion breaks some new ground in the Eleventh Circuit, which covers Florida, Georgia and Alabama. Among the court's holdings are the following:

• The Secretary of Transortation's jurisdiction is not limited to transportation that crosses state lines, but extends to transporation that is part of the broader concept of "interstate commerce."
• Purely intrastate transportation can constitute part of interstate commerce if it ispart of a “continuous stream of interstate travel."
• The "incidental-to-air" exemption does not limit application of the motor carrier exemption. The court held that this exemption to the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction applies to economic regulation, not to safety regulation. Thus, the Secretary of Transportation has jurisdiction to prescribe safety regulation for transportation that is "incidental-to-air," i.e. within 25 miles of an airport.

The motor carrier exemption is complicated and has been the subject of much litigation. For employers in the Eleventh Circuit, the Walters decision clarifies several key issues. Still, the opinion leaves open a couple of issues:

• Does a company have to engage in more than de minimus interstate transportation, where it has the appropriate federal licensing and indisputably performs some transportation crosses state lines? The court declined to answer this question, finding that even if such a test applied, ACLM engaged in more than de minimus interstate transportation.
• Do airport-to-seaport trips constitute interstate commerce if they are not performed pursuant to formal contractual arrangements with airlines or cruise lines? The court declined to answer this question, finding that even if such a test applied, ACLM had contractual arrangements with cruise lines to transport passengers on its buses.
   

Litigation of these open issues is bound to occur as the proliferation of FLSA lawsuits continues. But for now, Walters is the latest word on the status of the motor carrier exemption in the Eleventh Circuit.

Last month I reported that United States District Judge Kenneth L. Ryskamp had sanctioned the Shavitz Law Group, one of the leading plaintiff-side wage-hour firms in Florida, for soliciting plaintiffs in violation of Florida Bar Rules.  The case was Hamm v. TBC Corp. and Tire Kingdom, Inc., Case No. 07-80829-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC. 

The Shavitz firm recently struck back, filing a motion to disqualify or recuse Judge Ryskamp from presiding over a different case, a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Abercrombie & Fitch.  The motion quoted Judge Ryskamp's comments during a hearing in the Hamm case:

I have had our law clerk check and the Shavitz firm has filed 1,332 cases in the Southern District of Florida since 2000, so we see these things continually, virtually never see them go to trial, I think that I have had one trial with all the cases that have been filed.

In looking at the statistical numbers, they are usually closed within three months of the time they are filed, so what is very clear to me is that most defendants are saying how much is it going to cost me to defend this case and what is the claim and the claim is so small it would cost most to have the lawyers defend it, so they are basically nuisance type claims that get bought off, of course the lawyer’s fees are always – not always, but very often considerably more than the claim itself – and I think this is certainly an area for some Congressional oversight, I think there ought to be written into the statute a provision that a letter demand must be made upon the employer before a lawsuit can be filed because the way this thing is working is just a lawyer’s retirement bill. . . . this has gotten out of hand, I think we have more of these cases in the Southern District of Florida than there are anyplace else in the country and that’s probably because of the Shavitz law firm. . . . I think the problem needs to be resolved.

The Shavitz firm argued that these comments, and others that Judge Ryskamp has made about the Shavitz firm, demonstrate "an apparent bias or prejudice against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel, such that disqualification/recusal is mandatory."

Three days later, Judge Ryskamp issued an order recusing himself from the case. 

Judge Ryskamp's recusal notwithstanding, from my perspective as a defense attorney, his comments were on the money. Many, if not most, FLSA cases are settled on a nuisance value basis.  In such cases, there is often only a few thousand dollars of overtime pay at issue.  And the employer often has solid defenses which it could prove on summary judgment or at trial.  But after some frank discussions with defense counsel, the employer concludes that it makes more sense to settle the case for, say, $10,000 than to pay its own attorneys $50,000 to $100,000 to litigate the case.  An additional factor is the uncertainty of litigation:  if the employee proves liability, even for a small amount, the employer will be on the hook for the plaintiff's attorney's fees as well.  So these cases typically settle, and Shavitz (or one of his colleagues in the plaintiffs' bar) move on to their next case.  The cycle continues, and South Florida continues to lead the nation in wage-hour lawsuits.   

The following is a reprint of a client alert authored by EBG attorneys Doug Weiner and Frank Morris, Jr.  It should be of interest to all Florida employers that are considering a reduction in force.

For many employers, these are desperate economic times. Every entity facing diminished revenue must consider cost cuts to survive. As news reports show, reductions in force (RIFs) are being used daily to achieve cost savings, and for some employers they may be the best solution. In some cases, however, the savings are not immediate as a result of statutorily required or voluntary notice periods, as well as costs of severance pay.

A different approach may be a furlough strategy, customized to fit each employer’s needs, which may also achieve a significant cost-savings benefit. Implementing a furlough can help retain the employer’s experienced workforce at a reduced cost, to help the enterprise weather the economic crisis. Most employees faced with, for example, the choice of a 20 percent annual pay reduction or the loss of their job would not hesitate to choose a reduction in pay. Further, both employers and employees taking advantage of a furlough program are well-positioned to take advantage of any increase in business activity in the inevitable economic recovery, whether it be this year or next. Furloughs are often viewed by the workforce more favorably than layoffs, thus preserving morale in the organization as well.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires hourly and non-exempt salaried employees to be paid time-and-one-half their regular rate for weekly hours worked over forty. Accordingly, the first place to look for cuts in employee payroll costs is in non-exempt employee overtime pay. The FLSA was designed to give employers an incentive to spread employment from employees who work over forty weekly hours to other workers who are working fewer hours. In an environment where costs are critical, it is generally an inefficient use of payroll dollars to pay the additional wage premium required for overtime work.

Eliminating non-exempt overtime work is only the first step in reducing payroll costs among hourly non-exempt employees, salaried non-exempt employees and salaried exempt employees. Take an example in which it has been decided that in a department of 100 employees, where all three categories of employees work, that payroll expenses must be cut by 20 percent. One possibility is to reduce the department headcount by 20 percent, eliminating 20 jobs and the costs associated with them. Another possibility is to implement a mandatory furlough period with 20 percent pay cuts for all 100 employees. The furlough strategy takes more administrative time to manage properly, but it potentially saves 20 jobs while achieving the necessary cost-saving objective.

The FLSA allows employers to implement a variety of options to impose salary reductions and pay cuts, as do most state laws. A salary may be prospectively reduced without violating the “salary-basis” test of the FLSA for exempt employees, including a reduction in pay proportionate to a reduction in the number of days worked. Managers may implement furloughs and RIFs simultaneously or in a phased sequence. As with all such strategies, any applicable state and local requirements need to be determined, as federal law will defer to a state or local standard that provides a greater protection to the employee. California, as shown by the state’s decision to furlough state employees, allows furloughs to be implemented in accord with particular wage-hour requirements that must be considered.

The FLSA permits prospective adjustments to an exempt employee’s salary, including revisions to commission agreements or bonus compensation plans based on the quantity or quality of work, which do not reduce the “predetermined amount” of the employee’s salary (of course, the terms of the plans also need to be checked before changes are made). In concept, if the duties test for exemption is satisfied, the predetermined salary of, e.g., an exempt Sales Manager, could be as low as $455 per week, while the compensation the employee actually receives could be substantially higher (based upon commissions for meeting sales goals or bonuses for meeting other performance criteria). To preserve the salary basis of the exempt employee, the predetermined amount of salary would have to be paid for workweeks in which there were no commissions, or for which no bonus payments were made.

Careful strategic planning is required before implementing a furlough. Considerations include:

• Exempt salaried employees may have their salaries prospectively reduced to a lower predetermined amount so long as they stay above $455 per week. Salary adjustments may not be designed to circumvent the requirements of the FLSA.

• Hourly workers must be paid for every hour they are directed or permitted to work. Permitting “extra” work as, for example, spending more than de minimus time checking a Blackberry®, even when unauthorized, may well give rise to the obligation to pay for the time. Accordingly, managers must take the necessary steps to ensure the furlough plan realizes the necessary cost savings.

• It is a good practice to give employees clear notice specifying that no “volunteer work” is permissible and no work is to be performed unless specifically authorized by a predetermined schedule or authorization by an appropriate manager. Implementing a strict policy of prohibiting unscheduled work and having an administrative procedure to uniformly enforce the policy is well advised.

• Managers may consider asking hourly and salaried non-exempt employees for the return of employer-owned remote access devices during a furlough. Employees who access their work email accounts while on their “time off” may be working, or may start working. If they are working, even though advised not to do so, the employer may well incur wage liability, defeating the purpose of the furlough. Unauthorized work by non-exempt employees in violation of the employer’s furlough policy may generate exposure to significant wage claims. Violations of the furlough policy should be considered a serious disciplinary issue, warranting sanctions, including suspension and discharge. Withholding pay for hours actually worked, however, is not a legal option, even when the hours worked were not authorized.

• Salaries for exempt and non-exempt employees may be prospectively reduced so long as those adjustments are not so frequent as to appear designed to circumvent the requirements of the FLSA. Quarterly adjustments have been found by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to be in compliance with the FLSA. Adjustments to the predetermined amounts of salary should be implemented as infrequently as feasible so as not to raise an argument that the adjustments are a pretext to avoid compliance with the FLSA.

In sum, properly implemented salary reductions should comply with the salary requirements of the FLSA. Although it requires strategic planning and careful implementation, employers may find many benefits by implementing an effective cost-savings furlough plan that saves money and jobs, versus the RIFs dominating the news.