Industrial Welfare Commmission

Featured on Employment Law This Week – California health care workers can still waive some breaks.

In February 2015, a California appeals court invalidated an order from the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) that allowed health care workers to waive certain meal breaks. The court found the order, which allowed the workers to miss one of their two meal periods when working over eight hours, was in direct conflict with the California Labor Code. The state legislature then passed a new law giving the IWC authority to craft exceptions going forward for health care workers. This month, the appeals court concluded that its 2015 decision was based on a misreading of the statute and that even waivers occurring before the new law are valid.

Watch the segment below and see our recent post on this topic.

Kevin SullivanA little more than two years ago, we wrote about how a California Court of Appeal’s decision exposed health care employers to litigation if they relied upon IWC Wage Order 5 for meal period waivers. That decision was Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center (“Gerard I”), where the Court of Appeal concluded that IWC Wage Order 5 was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal period waivers on shifts over 12 hours. Much has happened since then.

After Gerard I was published, the Legislature moved quickly to enact SB 327, which amended Labor Code section 516 to state in pertinent part that “the health care employee meal period waiver provisions in Section 11(D) of [IWC] Wage Orders 4 and 5 were valid and enforceable on and after October 1, 2000, and continue to be valid and enforceable. This subdivision is declarative of, and clarifies, existing law.” In enacting SB 327, the Legislature specifically noted “the uncertainty caused by a recent appellate court decision” – Gerard I – and that “without immediate clarification, hospitals will alter scheduling practices.”

After SB 327 was enacted, the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its decision in Gerard I and to reconsider the case in light of SB 327. The Court of Appeal has now done so. On March 1, 2017, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal in Gerard II held that SB 327 is effective retroactively. As a result, the second meal period waivers that the plaintiffs had signed were valid and enforceable. Consequently, the Gerard II Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, denying class certification, and striking class allegations.

The Gerard II decision is a welcome development for California health care employers who have relied upon IWC Wage Order 5 for second meal period waivers, reinforcing the use of such waivers for employees who work more than 12 hours in a shift.

Employers in California – and healthcare employers in particular – have been besieged by wage-hour class actions for more than a decade. They have been sued repeatedly on claims that they have not complied with the terms of Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. Now, as a result of a new decision from the California Court of Appeal, they may face lawsuits based not on a failure to comply with the language of a Wage Order, but because they in fact relied upon language in a Wage Order. It is a development that may lead many employers to throw up their hands and quote the old adage, “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.”

The IWC issues industry-specific Wage Orders with which employers are expected to comply. The failure to comply may lead not only to agency investigations, but to class action lawsuits seeking damages, a variety of penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees.

On February 10, 2015, in Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center, the California Court of Appeal held that it was improper for an employer to rely upon the language of the governing Wage Order. The employer had relied upon a provision of Wage Order 5 that expressly authorized healthcare workers to waive one of their two required meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. The Court of Appeal concluded that the provision was contrary to the California Labor Code and partially invalidated it.

Blindfolded businessmanIn reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal determined that the IWC had no authority to adopt a regulation that conflicts with the express language of California Labor Code section 512(a), which provides as follows: “An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.” (Italics added.) For this reason, the Court partially invalidated Wage Order 5 to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours.

With one exception, the Court determined that the hospital and employees must now litigate whether or not the Court’s decision should apply retroactively. That one exception, however, is significant as the Court ruled that “there is no compelling reason of fairness or public policy that warrants an exception to the general rule of retroactivity for our decision partially invalidating [Wage Order 5]. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek premium pay . . . for any failure by [Orange Coast] hospital to provide mandatory second meal periods before [February 10, 2015] that falls within the governing three-year limitations period.” That premium pay which the Court determined the Gerard plaintiffs are entitled to seek consists of one hour of pay at an employee’s regular rate of compensation for each employee who worked more than 12 hours and did not get a second meal period – and for each instance there was no second meal period.

The decision is a troubling development for California healthcare employers who have relied upon the regulation – and that may now face class action lawsuits precisely because they did so. Healthcare employers that have relied on Wage Order 5’s express language permitting employees to waive their second meal periods when working more than 12 hours in a shift should reevaluate their practices with counsel promptly to determine how to address such practices prospectively. And, unfortunately, they may now also face lawsuits based upon their past reliance on the Wage Order.

by Michael Kun and Aaron Olsen

Already besieged by wage-hour lawsuits, employers with operations in California may see more of these cases, or may be brought into wage-hour litigation where they might not have been before, as a result of a new decision by the California Supreme Court expanding the definition of "employer." The decision creates greater exposure to litigation for those companies that use the services of independent contractors, temporary agencies or other similar entities with whom the employer has a close relationship.

The plaintiffs in Martinez v. Combs were seasonal agricultural workers who picked strawberries for Munoz & Sons (“Munoz”). Munoz sold strawberries through a number of merchants, including Apio, Inc. (“Apio”) and Combs Distribution Co. (“Combs”). The merchants would routinely enter the strawberry fields to describe how they wanted the strawberries packaged and to check the quality of the packaged strawberries before they shipped. The merchants would point out mistakes to Munoz’s foreman, as well as directly to the strawberry pickers. After the price of strawberries declined, Munoz failed to pay its strawberry pickers and subsequently declared bankruptcy. In addition to suing their employer, Plaintiffs also sued Apio and Combs for a variety of California Labor Code violations, including failure to pay a minimum wage. The central issue on appeal was whether the strawberry merchants, Apio and Combs, were considered joint employers of plaintiffs under the California Labor Code.

In order to determine whether the strawberry merchants were employers and thus liable for Labor Code violations, the Court examined various definitions of “employer.” After engaging in a lengthy review of 98 years worth of legislative history, the Court adopted the Industrial Welfare Commission’s ("IWC") broad definition of "employer." The Court held that the IWC was authorized by the legislature to define this term as it saw fit, holding that to "employ" someone means: (a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship. In adopting the IWC’s position, the Court rejected defendants’ argument that California law incorporates the “economic realities” test used in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The “suffer or permit to work” definition is the broadest of the three definitions.

The plaintiffs argued that the strawberry merchants, Apio and Combs, “suffered or permitted” plaintiffs to work because they knew plaintiffs were working and the work benefitted the merchants. The Court rejected this argument. The court found that because Munoz, not Apio or Combs, had the power to hire and fire plaintiffs, to set their wages and hours, and to tell plaintiffs when and where to report to work, Apio and Combs did not “suffer or permit” plaintiffs to work. Likewise, although Apio and Combs had representatives in the strawberry fields that gave instructions to plaintiffs, that did not mean that they exercised control over plaintiffs. The court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that Munoz’s employees viewed the representatives of Apio or Combs to be their supervisors. Instead, plaintiffs believed that Munoz and Munoz’s foreman were their supervisors.

Although there will undoubtedly be more litigation about the definition of an employer, Martinez provides useful guidance for companies to evaluate the contracts that they have with their vendors, contractors and temporary employment agencies so that they do not unwittingly become liable for another company’s Labor Code violations. This case illustrates the fine line between conducting quality control over another company’s work product and controlling the conditions of the other company’s employees. Likewise, the case shows how companies can minimize the risk of being classified as "joint employers" if they make it clear in their contract and in practice that the other entity has the sole right to hire, pay, discipline and terminate the workers.