On April 12, 2018, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued the first Opinion Letters since the Bush administration, as well as a new Fact Sheet.  The Obama administration formally abandoned Opinion Letters in 2010, but Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta has restored the practice of issuing these guidance documents.  Opinion Letters, as Secretary Acosta states in the DOL’s April 12 press release, are meant to explain “how an agency will apply the law to a particular set of facts,” with the goal of increasing employer compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and other laws.  Not only do Opinion Letters clarify the law, but pursuant to Section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, they provide a complete affirmative defense to all monetary liability if an employer can plead and prove it acted “in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on” an Opinion Letter.  29 U.S.C. § 259; see also 29 C.F.R. Part 790.  For these reasons, employers should study these and all forthcoming Opinion Letters closely.

Opinion Letter FLSA2018-18 addresses the compensability of travel time under the FLSA, considering the case of hourly-paid employees with irregular work hours who travel in company-provided vehicles to different locations each day and are occasionally required to travel on Sundays to the corporate office for Monday trainings.  The Opinion Letter reaffirms the following guiding principles: First, as a general matter, time is compensable if it constitutes “work” (a term not defined by the FLSA).  Second, “compensable worktime generally does not include time spent commuting to or from work.”  Third, travel away from the employee’s home community is worktime if it cuts across the employee’s regular workday.  Fourth, “time spent in travel away from home outside of regular working hours as a passenger on an airplane, train, boat, bus, or automobile” is not worktime.

With these principles in mind, this letter provides two non-exclusive methods to reasonably determine normal work hours for employees with irregular schedules in order to make an ultimate judgment call on the compensability of travel time.  Under the first method, if a review of an employee’s hours during the most recent month of regular employment reveals typical work hours, the employer can consider those the normal hours going forward.  Under the second method, if an employee’s records do not show typical work hours, the employer can select the average start and end times for the employee’s work days.  Alternatively, where “employees truly have no normal work hours, the employer and employee … may negotiate … a reasonable amount of time or timeframe in which travel outside the employees’ home communities is compensable.”  Crucially, an employer that uses any of these methods to determine compensable travel time is entitled to limit such time to that accrued during normal work hours.

Opinion Letter FLSA2018-19 addresses the compensability of 15-minute rest breaks required every hour by an employee’s serious health condition (i.e., protected leave under the FMLA).  Adopting the test articulated by the Supreme Court in the Armourdecision—whether the break primarily benefits the employer (compensable) or the employee (non-compensable)—the letter advises that short breaks required solely to accommodate the employee’s serious health condition, unlike short, ordinary rest breaks, are not compensable because they predominantly benefit the employee.  The letter cautions, however, that employers must provide employees who take FMLA-protected breaks with as many compensable rest breakers as their coworkers, if any.

Opinion Letter CCPA2018-1NA addresses whether certain lump-sum payments from employers to employees are considered “earnings” for garnishment purposes under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the “CCPA”).  The letter articulates the central inquiry as whether the lump-sum payment is compensation “for the employee’s services.” The letter then analyzes 18 types of lump-sum payments, concluding that commissions, bonuses, incentive payments, retroactive merit increases, termination pay, and severance pay, inter alia, are earnings under the CPA, butlump-sum payments for workers’ compensation, insurance settlements for wrongful termination, and buybacks of company shares are not.

Finally, Fact Sheet #17S addresses the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirement exemptions for employees who perform bona fide executive, administrative, professional, and outside sales duties (known as the “white collar exemptions”) in the context of higher education institutions.  Specifically, the letter provides guidance as to the exempt status of faculty members, including coaches, non-teacher learned professionals (e.g., CPAs, psychologists, certified athletic trainers, librarians, and postdoctoral fellows), administrative employees (e.g., admissions counselors and student financial aid officers), executive employees (e.g., department heads, deans, and directors), and student-employees (i.e., graduate teaching assistants, research assistants, and student residential assistants).  Of note, the letter confirms that the DOL is undertaking rulemaking to revise the regulations that govern the white collar exemptions.

In November 2017, four convenience store franchisees brought suit in federal court against 7-Eleven, Inc., alleging that they and all other franchisees were employees of 7-Eleven. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, entitled Haitayan, et al. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., case no. CV 17-7454-JFW (JPRx).

In alleging that they were 7-Eleven’s employees, the franchisees brought claims for violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the California Labor Code, alleging overtime and expense reimbursement violations. The trial court granted judgment in 7-Eleven’s favor, concluding that 7-Eleven was not the four franchisees’ employer under California law or federal law.

The court noted that the franchisees’ “basic legal theory underlying [their] claims [wa]s that 7-Eleven’s restrictive policies and practices created an employment relationship between the parties.” The court concluded that because the franchisees could not establish an employment relationship, each of their claims failed.

For example, while 7-Eleven required the franchisees to keep their stores open 24 hours per day, 364 days per year, the court was persuaded by the fact that the franchisees themselves were not “actually required to work at the stores a particular number of hours or on particular days” – they could hire employees to meet these requirements. And while the franchisees argued that 7-Eleven controls the payment of all wages and instructs franchisee on pay practices, performance appraisals, and disciplinary actions, including worker terminations, that did not persuade the court because “the fact that a franchisor pays a franchisees’ employees’ wages does not create an employment relationship,” and the franchisees admitted that they have unfettered discretion to hire and fire employees and set wages.

Because the franchise agreements explicitly provided that franchisees “control the manner and means of the operation” of their stores and “exercise complete control over and all responsibility for all labor relations and the conduct of [franchisees’] agents and employees, including the day-to-day operations” of franchisees’ stores and employees, the court concluded that such minimal control was insufficient to make franchisees common law employees of 7-Eleven.

The federal court’s decision is a welcome one for franchisors that have sound franchise agreements and practices in place. It is certainly possible that the court would have reached a different conclusion had 7-Eleven’s franchise agreement or practices provided for 7-Eleven to have a greater right to exercise control over franchisees.  In light of this decision, franchisors should review their agreements and practices to ensure they do not have a right to control the wages, hours, or working conditions of franchisees.

For more than 70 years, the Supreme Court has construed exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) narrowly. In A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, for example, the Court stated that “[t]o extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”  324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).  The Supreme Court has restated this rule many times in the intervening years, and the lower courts have followed, citing this principle in virtually every significant case involving overtime exemptions.

On April 2,2018, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated ruling in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.  Marking the second time that the case has gone to the high court, the ruling held that the specific employees at issue—service advisors at an automobile dealership—are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.  What people will long remember the 5-4 ruling for, however, is not the exempt status of the particular plaintiffs in that case, but rather the Court’s rejection of the principle that courts construe FLSA exemptions narrowly.  By removing a heavy judicial thumb from the workers’ side of the scales in FLSA exemption litigation, Encino Motorcars is likely to figure prominently in many pending and future exemption cases.

Background

In one of the law’s lesser-known subsections, FLSA section 13(b)(10)(A) exempts from the federal overtime requirement “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A).  In the early 1970s, the U.S. Department of Labor originally interpreted this language as not applying to so-called “service advisors,” whom the Court described as “employees at car dealerships who consult with customers about their servicing needs and sell them servicing solutions.”  (Opinion at 1-2.)  Courts took a different view, and from 1978 to 2011 the Department accepted the view that service advisors are exempt.  (Id. at 2.)  In 2011, the Department changed course again, issuing a regulation stating that service advisors are not “salesmen” and thus are not within the scope of the exemption.  (Id. at 3.)

In 2012, current and former service advisors sued a California car dealership, asserting that they are non-exempt and entitled to overtime. The dealership moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the section 13(b)(10)(A) exemption applies.  The district court agreed and dismissed the case, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  In April 2016, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, concluding in a 6-2 ruling that the Department’s 2011 regulation is invalid and entitled to no deference, and remanding the matter to the Ninth Circuit to consider the meaning of the statutory language without the regulation.  (Opinion at 3-4 (discussing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. — (2016)).)  On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held that the service advisors are not exempt, and the case went back up to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The meaning of the words in the statute

Noting the parties’ agreement that certain language in the exemption either does not apply or is not at issue, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, distilled the legal question to whether service advisors are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” for purposes of the statute’s overtime exemption. (Opinion at 5.)  The Court began its analysis by observing that “[a] service advisor is obviously a ‘salesman.’”  (Id. at 6.)  The Court looked to dictionary definitions of “salesman,” concluding that the term means “someone who sells goods or services.”  (Id.)  The Court stated that “[s]ervice advisors do precisely that.”  (Id.)

The Court then held that “[s]ervice advisors are also ‘primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.’” (Opinion at 6.)  Once again turning to dictionaries, the Court observed that [t]he word ‘servicing’ in this context can mean either ‘the action of maintaining or repairing a motor vehicle’ or ‘[t]he action of providing a service.’”  (Id.)  To the Court, “[s]ervice advisors satisfy both definitions.  Service advisors are integral to the servicing process.”  (Id.)  Although they “do not spend most of their time physically repairing automobiles[,]” neither do “partsmen,” another category of employees whom “[a]ll agree . . . are primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.”  (Id.)  Thus, “the phrase ‘primarily engage in . . . servicing automobiles’ must include some individuals who do not physically repair automobiles themselves”; and the verbiage “applies to partsmen and service advisors alike.”  (Id.)

The inapplicability of an arcane rule of statutory construction

The Court then rejected the Ninth Circuit’s use of the so-called “distributive canon,” a principle of statutory construction whereby courts may interpret a statute in a manner other than indicated by its plain language, and instead relate certain words back only to particular words appearing earlier in the statute. Here, the exemption uses the expansive, disjunctive word “or” three times, but the Ninth Circuit declined to read “or” in its usual sense, instead interpreting “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements” as meaning “any salesman . . . primarily engaged in selling” and “any . . . partsman[] or mechanic primarily engaged in . . . servicing[.]”  (Opinion at 4, 7.)  The Court gave three reasons for declining to apply the distributive canon to FLSA section 13(b)(10)(A): (1) the absence of one-to-one matching, as the Ninth Circuit’s reading requires pairing one category of employees with “selling” but two categories of employees with “servicing”; (2) the possibility, and indeed reasonableness, of construing the statute as written; and (3) the inconsistency of using the narrowing canon in light of the exemption’s overall broad language.  (Id. at 8.)

Rejection of the narrow construction rule

The most significant aspect of the Court’s ruling is its rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the “narrow construction” principle for FLSA exemptions:

The Ninth Circuit also invoked the principle that exemptions to the FLSA should be construed narrowly. We reject this principle as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA.

(Opinion at 9 (emphasis added, citation omitted).) The Court observed that “[b]ecause the FLSA gives no ‘textual indication’ that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no reason to give [them] anything other than a fair (rather than a “narrow”) interpretation.’”  (Id. (citation omitted).)  The Court remarked that “exemptions are as much a part of the FLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement.  We thus have no license to give the exemption anything but a fair reading.”  (Id. (citation omitted).)

The Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on a 1966-67 Handbook from the Department, as well as legislative history that was silent on the issue of service advisors. (Opinion at 9-11.)

The Dissent

Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. They disagreed with the Court’s linguistic construction of the exemption, while arguing that the regular schedules worked by service advisors render overtime exemption unnecessary.  (Dissent at 3-7.)  The dissent rejected the car dealership’s asserted reliance interest and concern for retroactive liability, noting the potential availability of the FLSA’s good faith defense.  (Id. at 7-8).  Finally, the dissent criticized the Court for rejecting the narrow construction principle for FLSA exemptions “[i]n a single paragraph . . . without even acknowledging that it unsettles more than half a century of our precedent.”  (Id. at 9 n.7.)

What The Decision Means For Employers

Most immediately, Encino Motorcars affects car dealerships by concluding that service advisors are exempt from the federal overtime requirement.  The decision, however, will reach far more broadly than just this one industry.  Since the 1940s, courts grappling with the meaning of ambiguously-worded FLSA exemptions have invoked the narrow construction rule as an often outcome-determinative facet of their decisions.  It served as much more than a tie-breaker, instead creating a very strong presumption of non-exempt status unless an employer could demonstrate that an exemption “plainly and unmistakably” applies.  In light of Encino Motorcars, that rule no longer has any place in interpreting FLSA exemptions.

What this means for employers is that it should now be easier than before for employers to persuade courts that employees fall within overtime exemptions. Now, employers must merely show that their reading of the exemption is more consistent with the statutory and regulatory text, rather than showing that there is little or no doubt about the matter.

At the same time, courts may find themselves tempted to resist this development, especially when construing exemptions under state law. It would not be surprising, for example, to see some courts begin to construe state-law exemptions differently from their FLSA counterparts, even when the wording of the exemptions is identical.

As we have discussed previously, in early September the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) withdrew its appeal of last November’s ruling from the Eastern District of Texas preliminarily enjoining the Department’s 2016 Final Rule that, among other things, more than doubled the minimum salary required to satisfy the Fair Labor Standards Act’s executive, administrative, and professional exemptions from $455 per week ($23,660 per year) to $913 per week ($47,476 per year).  The DOL abandoned its appeal in light of the district court’s ruling on August 31, 2017 granting summary judgment and holding that the 2016 increase to the salary level conflicted with the statute and thus was invalid, a ruling that rendered the appeal of the injunction moot.

On October 30, 2017, to the surprise of many observers, the DOL filed a notice of appeal regarding the district court’s summary judgment ruling, taking the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.   Four days later, the DOL filed an unopposed motion asking the Fifth Circuit to stay the appeal in light of the Department’s pending rulemaking to update the salary requirement.  On November 6, 2017, the Fifth Circuit granted the motion, staying the appeal pending the outcome of the new rulemaking.

The DOL’s maneuvers may appear confusing. In short, the district court’s summary judgment ruling causes a certain amount of heartburn for the Department because the court in effect concluded that although the DOL has the authority to require a minimum salary for these exemptions, there is a point beyond which the Department cannot go without having the salary level deemed invalid.  The court did not, however, provide a clear standard for identifying the outer limit of the Department’s authority to impose a salary threshold, and this uncertainty creates confusion and a risk of time-consuming and expensive litigation for the Department — and for employees and employers throughout the country.

By appealing the summary judgment ruling, the DOL preserves the option of challenging the decision rather than simply allowing it to remain on the books as a precedent.  Once the Department completes the rulemaking process and issues an updated salary standard, the likely final move would be for the Department to move to dismiss the litigation and to vacate the district court’s order on the basis that the challenge to the 2016 Final Rule has become moot.  Once the new rule is in place and the district court’s summary judgment ruling is no longer on the books, it will be as though the 2016 Final Rule never happened.

We will keep you posted as this matter develops.

Featured on Employment Law This Week: The California Supreme Court has clarified the state’s ambiguous “day of rest” provisions.

The provisions state that, with certain exceptions, employers will not cause “employees to work more than six days in seven.” The state’s high court addressed three questions about this law that had been certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court determined that employees are entitled to one day of rest per workweek. So, every Sunday marks the beginning of a new seven-day period. Additionally, the court clarified that employees who work six hours or less during each day of the week are not entitled to a day of rest and that employees can choose not to take the day of rest if they are fully aware of the entitlement.

Watch the segment below, with commentary from our colleague Kevin Sullivan, and read our recent post.

A new “comp time” bill that would dramatically change when and how overtime is paid to private sector employees in many, if not most, jurisdictions has passed the House of Representatives.  And unlike similar bills that have been considered over the years, this one might actually have a chance of passing. If it can get past an expected Democratic filibuster in the Senate, that is.

“Comp time” – short for “compensatory time” – is generally defined as paid time off that is earned and accrued by an employee instead of immediate cash payment for working overtime hours.

Generally speaking, public sector employers may provide “comp time” to employees.

However, putting aside various nuances and state law differences, it has long been the case that the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires private sector employers to pay non-exempt employees time-and-a-half for all work performed beyond 40 hours in a workweek.  “Comp time” generally is not permissible in the private sector.

(If you want to gain a better understanding of the various nuances and state law differences, we invite you to download our free wage-hour app, available on Apple and Android devices.)

This long-standing law could change under the new bill, known as the Working Families Flexibility Act (“the Act”). (Although its title references “working families,” it does not appear that the proposed limitation would be limited to persons with families. It would apply to single persons, too.)

Although its title does not reference the FLSA or overtime, the Act would amend the FLSA to allow private sector employers to offer non-exempt employees the choice between being paid in cash for hours they work beyond 40 in a work week or accruing an hour and one-half of paid time off.  More specifically, employees could accrue up to 160 hours of “comp time” for hours worked beyond 40 in a week – again, at a rate of an hour and one-half for each overtime hour worked.

The Act has been presented as a potential benefit to employers and employees alike – employers might be able to improve cash flow by postponing payments, and employees would have greater flexibility in scheduling their work around their personal lives.

As written, the Act would not apply to all employees. Instead, it would only apply to those employees who have worked at least 1,000 hours in a 12-month period before they agree to the employer’s proposed “comp time” arrangement.  In most circumstances, it would not apply to new hires, and it would not apply to many part-timers.

As written, eligible employees would have to agree in writing to the “comp time” arrangement.  Their agreement would have to be voluntary, and they would reserve the right to revoke their agreement at any time and receive cash for their unused “comp time.” At the same time, employers could revoke the “comp time” arrangement by giving their employees 30 days’ notice of the change in the employer’s policy.

Like much legislation, the Act leaves some questions unanswered and could lead to significant litigation if passed, including collective actions. On first glance, the most significant grounds for potential litigation would be the requirement that any acceptance of a “comp time” arrangement be entirely “voluntary.” Employees may well claim that they were pressured into accepting “comp time” by management, particularly those in seasonal businesses.

But the most significant unanswered question remains the most important – will the bill get past an expected filibuster?

The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has denied the U.S. Department of Labor’s application to stay the case in which the district court enjoined the DOL’s new overtime regulations. The DOL had asked the court for a stay while the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an interlocutory appeal of the injunction.

As wage and hour practitioners know:

  • In May 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor announced that it would implement new regulations increasing the salary threshold for the executive, administrative, and professional overtime exemptions to $47,476 ($913 per week);
  • In September 2016, a group of 21 states filed a Complaint in the Eastern District of Texas challenging the new regulations. A similar lawsuit was filed in the same court by several private industry groups, and those plaintiffs moved for summary judgment; and
  • In November 2016, the district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the new regulations. The district court made a preliminary conclusion that, because the FLSA did not reference any salary thresholds, the DOL had exceeded its authority.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the DOL’s application for interlocutory review, and ordered that briefing be concluded by January 31, 2017.

The DOL then sought a stay of the proceedings before the district court.

In denying the DOL’s motion, the district court stated that the decision to grant or deny a discretionary stay pending an interlocutory appeal depends on: (1) whether the application is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured without a stay; (3) whether a stay will substantially injure other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.

The district court stated that the DOL’s application argued only that the outcome of the case “will likely be controlled in large part by the Fifth Circuit’s decision on appeal.” Because the DOL did not “present a substantial case on the merits,” its application for a stay was denied.

Accordingly, the proceedings before the Fifth Circuit and the district court will proceed concurrently. We will continue to monitor each of these matters, and share any significant developments.

The new episode of Employment Law This Week offers a year-end roundup of the biggest employment, workforce, and management issues in 2016:

  • Impact of the Defend Trade Secrets Act
  • States Called to Ban Non-Compete Agreements
  • Paid Sick Leave Laws Expand
  • Transgender Employment Law
  • Uncertainty Over the DOL’s Overtime Rule and Salary Thresholds
  • NLRB Addresses Joint Employment
  • NLRB Rules on Union Organizing

Watch the episode below and read EBG’s Take 5 newsletter, “Top Five Employment, Labor & Workforce Management Issues of 2016.”

Even employers who were opposed to the new overtime regulations are in a quandary after the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas enjoined the Department of Labor from implementing new salary thresholds for the FLSA’s “white collar” exemptions.

Will the injunction become permanent?  Will it be upheld by the Fifth Circuit? 

Will the Department of Labor continue to defend the case when the Trump Administration is in place? 

What does the rationale behind the District Court’s injunction (that the language of the FLSA suggests exempt status should be determined based only on an employee’s duties) mean for the $455-per-week salary threshold in the “old” regulations?

As noted in our post regarding the injunction, whether employers can reverse salary increases that already have been implemented or announced is an issue that should be approached carefully.

For example, employers should be aware that state law may specify the amount of notice that an employer must provide to an employee before changing his or her pay.

In most states, employers merely need to give employees notice of a change in pay before the beginning of the pay period in which the new wage rate comes into effect.

But some states require impose additional requirements.  The New York Department of Labor, for example, explains that if the information in an employee’s wage statement changes, “the employer must tell employees at least a week before it happens unless they issue a new paystub that carries the notice. The employer must notify an employee in writing before they reduce the employee’s wage rate. Employers in the hospitality industry must give notice every time a wage rate changes.”

Maryland (and Iowa) requires notice at least one pay period in advance.  Alaska, Maine, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada and South Carolina have their own notice requirements.

Employers who are making changes to wage rates based on the status of the DOL’s regulations should be nimble – while also making sure that they are providing the notice required under state law.

Michael D. Thompson
Michael D. Thompson

In Gonzalez v. Allied Concrete Industries, Inc., thirteen construction laborers filed suit in the Eastern District of New York.  The plaintiffs claimed they worked in excess of forty hours per week, but were not paid overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

To obtain information regarding the plaintiffs’ activities during hours they claimed to have been working, the defendants sought an order compelling discovery of their ATM and cell phone records.

ATM Receipts

The defendants asserted that records of the plaintiffs’ ATM transactions were likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because they could reveal each plaintiff’s “whereabouts and activities during hours they claim to have been working.” The defendants relied in large part on Caputi v. Topper Realty Corp., a 2015 case decided by the same court.  In Caputi, a plaintiff asserting overtime claims was ordered to produce “a sampling of records of her ATM transactions” for the time period in question.

In denying the defendants’ motion, the Court acknowledged the ruling in Caputi.  However, the Court concluded that the discovery of ATM records was allowed in that case because the Caputi defendants stated that witnesses would testify that the plaintiff attended prolonged lunches during the workweek and withdrew cash from ATMs for that purpose.

Conversely, in Allied Concrete, the Court concluded that the defendants had not shown any “evidentiary nexus between the en masse discovery sought and a good faith basis to believe that such discovery material is both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.”

Cell Phone Records

The defendants in Allied Concrete also sought the release of the plaintiffs’ cell phone records in order to determine whether the plaintiffs “engaged in personal activities such as non-work related telephone calls, extended telephone calls, [and] frequent text messaging” during times they claimed to have been working.

The defendants cited to Caputi and to Perry v. The Margolin & Weinreb Law Group, another Eastern District of New York case from 2015.  In both cases, the plaintiffs asserting wage hour claims were ordered to produce cell phone records based on testimony that they had made personal telephone calls during the workday.  Allied Concrete had not obtained any such testimony.  Accordingly, the Court stated that the defendants’ speculation that the cell phone records might contain relevant evidence did not warrant a “wholesale intrusion into the private affairs” of the plaintiffs.

Employers, therefore, should be aware that electronic evidence of an employee’s activities may be discoverable in FLSA cases – provided that there is a sufficient basis for seeking the discovery.