Wage & Hour Defense Blog : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Epstein Becker Green Law Firm : DOL Enforcement, FLSA Coverage

By:  Peter M. Panken, Michael S. Kun, Douglas Weiner and Larissa Lalor-Rosado

Misclassification of employees as exempt from overtime compensation has become a cottage industry for plaintiff’s lawyers and for the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) in the Obama years.  One of the most difficult issues is whether employees meet the so-called administrative exemption to the Wage Hour laws.  In Hines v. State Room, the United States Circuit Court in New England offered some clarity and help to beleaguered employers holding that former banquet sales managers were exempt from overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

The FLSA, requires overtime pay at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a seven day period unless the employee is exempt. The three pronged test for exemption for administrative employees is whether the employee is (1) salaried (paid a regular amount of at least $455 for all hours worked in a workweek); (2) the employee’s primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) the employee’s primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.

Plaintiffs were banquet sales managers whose job included seeking potential customers for events at the employer, developing the elements of the party or other event and submitting the proposed contract terms for approval by senior officials of the Banquet Halls.

The Court found that Plaintiffs met the first two prongs for exemption: Plaintiffs were paid on a salary basis, and their work was primarily administrative because it was ancillary to the employer’s actual business of providing banquet services.

Plaintiffs claimed that they did not meet the third prong for exemption because they lacked the authority to make any decisions of financial consequence, supervisory authority or policy-making authority.

The Court found that while the plaintiffs’ discretion in matters having significant financial impact was subject to managerial approval, such restrictions did not detract from the judgment exercised in developing a proposal for the client. Plaintiffs’ duties included maintaining primary contact with a client, tailoring an event to their needs, and overseeing the event through to execution. The Court ruled that plaintiffs exercised adequate discretion as sales people to be designated as exempt.

Other Factors Considered for Exemption

The preamble to the current DOL regulations identifies a host of factors that courts have found sufficient to demonstrate that employees exercise independent judgment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22144. Such factors include:

·                     the ability to exercise discretion and independent judgment,

·                     freedom from direct supervision,

·                     personnel responsibilities,

·                     trouble-shooting or problem-solving activities on behalf of management,

·                     use of personalized communication techniques,

·                     authority to handle atypical or unusual situations,

·                     responsibility for assessing customer needs, primary contact to public or customers on behalf of the employer, the duty to anticipate competitive products or services and distinguish them from competitor’s products or services,

·                     advertising or promotion work, and coordination of departments, requirements or other activities for or on behalf of employer or employer’s clients or customers.

Unfortunately these factors are very fact intensive and do not provide a bright line test for exemption, But the Hines case does offer some useful precedent and guidance for employers. In any event, care must be taken to be sure that the law in a particular state or in a particular circuit does not impose a stricter limitation on the discretion and independent judgment issue.

Take-Away

An employer may retain the right to review an employee’s ability to create financial and contractual obligations and still properly classify the employee as exempt. Requiring managerial approval for these purposes does not necessarily detract from the judgment exercised by the employee at arriving at the proposal in the first place. In addition, as set forth above, there are numerous other factors that courts can consider in determining whether an employee should be designated as exempt.

by Dena L. Narbaitz and Marisa S. Ratinoff

While everyone awaits the California Supreme Court's ruling in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) – which is expected sometime in early 2012 and will determine the scope of an employer's meal and rest period obligations – employers must not lose sight of other important developments in California employment law. Below are brief summaries of some of the legislative enactments in California that will affect employers. Unless otherwise noted, these laws will take effect on January 1, 2012.

Read the full advisory online

By Michael Kun

On January 1, 2012, the minimum wage for employees working in San Francisco will rise to $10.24 per hour. 

This is, to our knowledge, the first time the minimum wage in any U.S. city has ever exceeded $10 per hour.

Employers with employees in San Francisco will need to make sure that they make appropriate adjustments to their payroll systems and practices to account for the increase.

By:  Michael Thompson

In Ibanez v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued the latest ruling in the ongoing dispute over whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 

The plaintiff in Ibanez was a former sales representative for Abbott.  Among other things, the plaintiff helped create “business plans which tracked doctors by market share and potential.”  The plaintiff also developed “game plan[s] or strateg[ies] for individual calls with physicians.”  Thus, the District Court ruled that the plaintiff exercised significant independent discretion, and therefore fell within the Administrative exemption of the FLSA. 

This dispute over the exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representatives has arisen as plaintiffs have argued with increasing frequency that the representatives do not fall under the Outside Sales exemption.  This argument is based on the fact that these sales representatives do not “close” any sales.  Rather, a sale is closed outside the presence of a sales representative (when a patient fills a prescription at a pharmacy). Accordingly, plaintiffs contend, the Outside Sales exemption is inapplicable to these sales representatives and they are therefore entitled to overtime.

The battle lines in this dispute over the status of pharmaceutical sales representatives have been drawn around the rulings of three federal circuit courts: the Ninth Circuit, which has applied the Outside Sales exemption to these sales representatives; the Third Circuit, which has applied the Administrative exemption to these sales representatives; and the Second Circuit, which has declined to apply either exemption, found sales representatives to be non-exempt and therefore required employers to pay overtime compensation.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., for example, rejected the argument that pharmaceutical sales representatives did not qualify for the Outside Sales exemption. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the sales representatives do not “close” direct sales.  However, the Court noted that the sales representatives were prohibited by law from making direct sales.  The Ninth Circuit accordingly held that, in the context of the industry, “common sense” showed that the pharmaceutical sales representatives fell within the terms of the Outside Sales exemption.

Conversely, in In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Novartis sales representatives did not meet the requirements of the Outside Sales exemption because they did not “make sales.”  

The Second Circuit then evaluated whether the sales representatives had enough independent discretion to qualify for the Administrative exemption.  It was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to visit a given physician a certain number of times.  It was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to promote a given drug a certain number of times, and it was undisputed that the Novartis sales representatives were required to hold at least a certain number of promotional events per trimester.  Thus, the Second Circuit accepted the sales representatives claim that she did “low-level discretionless marketing work” and did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment to satisfy the Administrative exemption

Finally, in Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that thus it was unnecessary to consider the Outside Sales Exemption because the sales representatives in that case satisfied the FLSA’s Administrative exemption.  The Third Circuit noted that the plaintiff developed her own strategic plan to achieve higher sales.  The plaintiff herself prioritized her responsibilities in a manner that maximized business results. Indeed, the plaintiff admitted that “[i]t was really up to [her] to run the territory the way [she] wanted to.”  The Third Circuit concluded that, by formulating and implementing the strategies for her territory, the plaintiff exercised sufficient independent discretion to qualify for the Administrative exemption

Like the plaintiff in the Johnson & Johnson case, the plaintiff in Ibanez exercised the discretion to develop his own business plans and thus stood in contrast to the plaintiff in the Novartis case.  Indeed, the District Court cited to twelve admissions made by the plaintiff regarding his job duties.  Seven of those admissions related to plaintiff developing various strategic plans (e.g. business plans, call plans, focus plans, etc.).

Thus, Ibanez further demonstratesthat the key to establishing the Administrative exemption for pharmaceutical sales representatives is the exercise discretion in formulating business strategies. Accordingly, sales representatives who help to create their own business plans have a strong argument for exempt status, while sales representatives who carry out strategies given to them have a more difficult argument.

By:      David Garland and Douglas Weiner

In February 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave a resounding victory to employers in the pharmaceutical industry by finding that pharmaceutical sales representatives are covered by the outside sales exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, No. 10-15257 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011). Plaintiffs, and the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) in an amicus brief, had argued the exemption did not apply because sales reps are prohibited from making the final sale. Prescription medicine in the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry can only be sold to the ultimate consumer with the authorization of a licensed physician. Sales reps use their “selling skills” to persuade doctors to prescribe their employer’s products when the doctor’s patients have a medical need for them. Sales reps do not transfer title to the medicine themselves.

Previously the Second Circuit, in In Re Novartis, took a contrary view and adopted the Secretary of Labor’s position that the outside sales exemption did not apply to pharmaceutical sales representatives specifically because they were prohibited by regulation from making direct sales. The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ and DOL’s “rigid, formalistic interpretation” of the FLSA’s definition of “sale,” which provides that “Sale” … includes any “sale … or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. 203(k). Because of the uncertainty in this unsettled area of law, both the employee plaintiffs and the employer asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Pertinent to the aggressive approach the DOL has recently taken in submitting unsolicited amicus briefs in significant cases, another issue the Supreme Court may review is the degree of deference, if any, the court owes to an amicus brief submitted by the DOL. Again in stark contrast, the Second Circuit gave the DOL’s amicus brief “controlling deference” to interpret the DOL’s own regulations while the Ninth Circuit gave the DOL’s amicus brief “no deference” finding it was a departure from established industry norm that the DOL used to short-cut the public notice – and – comment rule making procedures.       

It would be a most welcome development for the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit and resolve this dramatic split in the circuit courts. However, even if the Second Circuit’s view of the “outside salesman” exemption is upheld, there are circumstances when sales reps may be exempt by virtue of the administrative exemption. Employers need clarity to structure employment practices without the ever-present threat of class action litigation.

by William J. Milani, Jeffrey M. Landes, Susan Gross Sholinsky, and Jennifer A. Goldman

For the first time, in 2012, New York employers must provide all New York employees with an annual notice and acknowledgment of pay rate and pay date ("Notice") pursuant to the Wage Theft Prevention Act ("WTPA"), which amended the New York State Labor Law ("Labor Law"), effective April 9, 2011.

As we previously reported (see Act Now Advisory "Governor Paterson Signs Overhaul of New York State Labor Law" (Dec. 15, 2010), and Act Now Advisory "They're Here – New York State Department of Labor Issues Updated 195.1 Templates and WTPA Frequently Asked Questions" (April 4, 2011)), the WTPA requires employers to provide their newly hired employees with Notices. Employers must also provide New York employees with written notice of certain changes in their wage rate and/or pay dates. In addition, the requirement that New York employers must provide Notices to all employees, annually, between January 1 and February 1 of each year, first becomes applicable in 2012.

Read the full advisory online

By Daniel R. Levy

On November 16, 2011, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that registered nurses are exempt from overtime compensation under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1 to 56a30, even if paid on an hourly basis, because they fall within the “professional” exemption. Anderson v. Phoenix Health Care, Inc., A-2607-10T2 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 16, 2011). The Court further held that, even if registered nurses were not exempt, a claim for overtime compensation may nevertheless fail under the NJWHL’s good faith exception, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.2, if the employer establishes that it conformed to the Division of Wage and Hour Compliance’s (“Division”) “longstanding interpretation that registered nurses are not entitled to overtime so long as they are compensated in excess of the weekly minimum” salary required for exemption.

The NJWHL requires that employees pay one-and-one-half times an employee’s hourly wage for each hour worked in excess of forty hours per week. Excepted from this general rule are individuals employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional or outside sales capacity. N.J.A.C. 12:56-7.1. Under N.J.A.C. 12:56-7.3(a), which was in effect until mid- 2011, a professional was defined as an employee whose primary duties consisted of work requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study, as distinguished from a general academic education, and who is compensated not less than $400.00 per week. The regulation, however, has since been superseded by regulations adopted on August 15, 2011 that adopted the federal regulations under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). N.J.A.C. 12:56-7.2(a); 43 N.J.R. 2353.

In Anderson, plaintiffs, registered nurses formerly employed by Phoenix Health Care, Inc., filed a putative class action seeking relief for overtime compensation under the NJWHL. Plaintiffs moved for class certification and defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that registered nurses are exempt from the NJWHL’s overtime requirements and asserting that plaintiffs’ claims were otherwise barred by the NJWHL’s good faith defense. The trial judge granted defendants’ cross-motion, and plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the Court affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ NJWHL claim despite plaintiffs’ argument that they were not exempt because they were paid on an hourly, not salaried, basis. The Court reasoned that although the applicable regulation did not expressly exempt professionals paid on an hourly basis, such as a majority of registered nurses, “the NJWHL was not intended to permit overtime to such employees when they are compensated at least as much as the weekly minimum referred to in N.J.A.C. 12:56-7.3(a)(5).” The Court also held that summary judgment was appropriate based upon the NJWHL’s good faith exception because defendants conformed to the Division’s “longstanding interpretation that registered nurses are not entitled to overtime so long as they are compensated in excess of the weekly minimum.”

In a footnote, the Court recognized that N.J.A.C. 12:56-7.3 was superseded by regulations adopting the federal regulations under the FLSA. Those federal regulations state, in pertinent part, that “[r]egistered nurses who are registered by the appropriate State examining board generally meet the duties requirements for the learned professional exemption but licensed practical nurses generally do not qualify as exempt learned professionals.” 29 C.F.R. 541.301(e)(2). The Court stated that it was not opining as to whether the result would be the same under the newly adopted regulations. 

Employers should proceed with caution as a result of the Court’s decision in Anderson, specifically because it construed regulations that have been superseded.  If New Jersey courts continue to follow this ruling under the newly promulgated regulations, it may lead to inconsistent results under the NJWHL and FLSA. It is clear that registered nurses paid on a salary basis will likely qualify under the professional exemption under both the NJWHL and the FLSA. 

It remains unclear, however, whether registered nurses paid on an hourly basis will be found exempt under the NJWHL. In order for a registered nurse to be exempt under the FLSA, the registered nurse must be paid on a salary basis. See 29 C.F.R. 541.600(e) (stating that the salary requirement applies to nurses); Anani v. CVS Rx Servs., 788 F.Supp.2d 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (registered nurses perform exempt duties and question of whether they are, in fact, exempt turns on whether they are paid on a salary basis). If New Jersey courts follow the FLSA regulations, as the newly promulgated New Jersey regulations state they will, registered nurses paid on an hourly basis will not be found exempt under the NJWHL. If, however, the decision in Anderson is followed under the new regulations, then registered nurses paid on an hourly basis will likely be found to be exempt under the NJWHL.         

By Douglas Weiner and Meg Thering

On October 20, 2011, the Computer Professionals Update Act (“the CPU Act”) – one of the first potential pieces of good news for employers this year – was introduced in the U.S. Senate.  If passed, the CPU act would expand the computer employee exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  S. 1747. 

Unlike much of the other legislation affecting employers that has been proposed or passed this year, the CPU Act would make business easier for employers and decrease the risk of employee misclassification lawsuits.  If the proposed legislation passes, employers would be able to classify more employees as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.  This would be a welcome change from the persistent drum beat of enhanced enforcement initiatives announced by government agencies and upticks in class and collective actions this year.

The computer employee exemption currently is limited to employees who earn at least $27.63 an hour and work as computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, or other similar positions.  Employees are exempt if their primary duties consist of: (1) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software or system functional specifications; (2) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (3) the design, documentation, testing, creation or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (4) a combination of such duties.  29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17); 541 C.F.R. § 400; U.S. Department of Labor Fact Sheet #17E.  In contrast, employees whose work consists of repairing or manufacturing computer equipment are not exempt. 541 C.F.R. § 401; U.S. Department of Labor Fact Sheet #17E.

The CPU Act would broaden the exemption to include any employee who works in a “computer or information technology occupation (including but not limited to, work related to computers, information systems, components, networks, software, hardware, databases, security, internet, intranet, or websites) as an analyst, programmer, engineer, designer, developer, administrator, or other similarly skilled worker.”  The primary duties for the exemption to apply would also be broader under the CPU Act, which would consider employees exempt if their primary duties are: (1) “the application of systems, network or database analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine or modify hardware, software, network, database, or system functional specifications;” or (2) “the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, securing, configuration, integration, debugging, modification of computer or information technology, or enabling continuity of systems and applications.”  Employees who perform a combination of these duties would still be considered exempt.  Also, employees who are “directing the work of individuals performing duties described [above], including training such individuals or leading teams performing such duties” would be considered exempt.  S. 1747. 

by Michael S. Kun, Eric A. Cook, and Jennifer A. Goldman

California Governor Jerry Brown has signed two employment-related bills into law, raising the stakes for employers doing business in California. The two laws, which increase the penalties for employers that wrongly classify employees as independent contractors or engage in "wage theft," both go into effect on January 1, 2012.

Read the full advisory online

By Evan J. Spelfogel

For several years, employers’ counsel have moved to block the combining of state wage and overtime claims with federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims, arguing that Rule 23 opt-out class actions were inherently inconsistent with FLSA collective opt-in actions. For support, they cited to the decision of the Third Circuit in De Asencio vs. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F. 3d 301 (3^rd Cir. 2003) reversing a district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction because of the inordinate size of the state-law class, the different terms of proof required by the implied contract state-law claims, and the general federal interest in opt-in wage actions. Since De Asencio, numerous district courts in the Third Circuit have dismissed state law wage claims that paralleled FLSA claims because of the “inherent incompatability” between opt-in collective actions and opt-out class actions. 

On September 26, 2011, the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals approved the combining of state law Rule 23 opt-out class wage claims with an FLSA opt-in collective action. Salim Shahriar, et al. vs. Smith & Wollensky Group, Inc. d/b/a Park Avenue Restaurant, et al., __________ F. 3d _________ (2^nd Cir. No. 10-1884). The Court noted that nothing in the FLSA statutory language or legislative history precluded joint prosecution of FLSA and state law wage claims in the same federal action. The U.S. Department of Labor weighed in with an amicus brief stating that the Restaurant had misinterpreted the FLSA, urging the court to reject any attempt to use the FLSA to bar certification of a class action of state law wage claims in federal courts merely because a FLSA collective action was pending.

The Second Circuit in Smith & Wollensky approved and relied substantially upon the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Irvin vs. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632 F. 3d 971 (7^th Cir. 2011) holding that a district court had abused its discretion in denying Rule 23 class action certification of state claims merely because of the existence of a parallel FLSA collective action. The Seventh Circuit noted that neither the text of the FLSA nor the procedures established by that statute suggested that the FLSA was intended generally to oust other ordinary procedures used in federal courts, or that class actions in particular could not be combined with an FLSA proceeding. 

The Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits also concluded that any alleged incompalability between the FLSA and Federal Rule 23 was insufficient to deny supplemental jurisdiction. See, Wang vs. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F. 3d 743 (9^th Cir. 2010) (vacated and remanded in light of Walmart, 564 U.S. _____, 10/3/11); and Lindsay vs. Government Employees Insurance Co., 448 F. 3d 416 (DC Cir. 2006). In summary, these Circuits have held that, while there may in some cases be exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, the “conflict” between the opt-in procedure under the FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 was not a sufficient cause by itself to decline jurisdiction.   

Ultimately, the US Supreme Court may be called upon to review an apparent split in the Circuits on this issue. In the meantime, employers are urged to continue to raise the issue in courts that have not yet ruled, and to urge “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” for courts in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits to bar hybrid state Rule 23 opt-out claims from the federal processes. 

This might include, for example, the size of the putative opt-out Rule 23 class in the state law claims as compared with the number of opt-ins in the FLSA collective action. Hybrid collective and class actions typically arise where only a small number of potential opt-in plaintiffs under a FLSA claim actually opt-in, while there are hundreds and perhaps thousands of putative class members with potential state law claims. One purpose of Congress in enacting the FLSA opt-in provision, it may be argued, was to control the volume of litigation and ensure that absent individuals would not have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge. The opt-in mechanism under the FLSA limits FLSA claims to those affirmatively asserted by employees “in their own right” and frees employers from the burden of representative actions. Allowing a Rule 23 opt-out option to be combined in the same lawsuit with an opt-in FLSA option allows plaintiffs to evade the requirements of the FLSA by permitting litigation through a representative action and bringing unnamed plaintiffs into the lawsuit. See, e.g., Dell vs. Citizens Financial Group, Inc., Western District Pennsylvania No. 2:10-Civ-00320, 6/8/11.

by Michael Kun

As we have mentioned previously on thisblog, the latest wave of wage-hour class actions to hit California employers is based on a claim that employees were not provided "suitable seating" under an obscure provision of California's Wage Orders.  To avoid having these cases removed to federal court,and to avoid the burden of establishing the elements for class certification, many plaintiffs' counsel have taken to filing these lawsuits not as class actions, but as representative actions under California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").

PAGA -- sometimes referred to as the "Bounty Hunter Law" or the "Sue Your Boss Law" -- allows a single employee to pursue claims on behalf of all "aggrieved employees," with potential recovery of up to $100 per employee for the first violation and $200 per employee for each subsequent violation.  The potential recovery can be enormous, and a plaintiff need not certify a class.

The constitutionality of PAGA has long been a matter of concern and dispute.  We and other defense counsel often raise constitutionality defenses to PAGA claims and raise those arguments at various stages of the cases.  Unfortunately, judges rarely take interest.

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Daniel Buckley apparently has seized on this issue and has articulated his intention to dismiss a PAGA seating case against Whole Foods Market on the grounds that PAGA is unconstitutional.  He appears to be one of the first judges, if not the first, to make such a ruling about PAGA. 

Assuming that Judge Buckley issues that ruling, it is all but certain that plaintiff's counsel will appeal.  The case will bear watching because a ruling by the Court of Appeal or, eventually, the California Supreme Court striking down PAGA on constitutionality grounds could shut down all claims under PAGA.  While that would not spell the end of wage-hour class actions, it would close off one of the avenues often relied upon by plaitniffs' counsel to increase the potential exposure in a case for settlement purposes.  And it may force plaitniffs to bring wage-hour claims as potential class actions, which would not only increase the likelihood of removal to federal court, but require plaintiffs to carry a significant burden in convincing a court to certify a class.

by Dean L. Silverberg, Jeffrey M. Landes, Susan Gross Sholinsky, and Jennifer A. Goldman

On September 21, 2011, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") announced a new program that will give businesses the opportunity to resolve prior worker classification issues by voluntarily reclassifying their non-employee workers (such as consultants, freelancers, and independent contractors) as employees for federal employment tax purposes. Officially called the "Voluntary Classification Settlement Program" ("VCSP"), this program is part of a larger "Fresh Start" initiative at the IRS to aid taxpayers and businesses in addressing their federal tax liabilities.

Read the full advisory online

By Michael Kun

It appears that oral argument before the California Supreme Court in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court will be broadcast live on-line on the California Channel on November 8, 2011 at 9 a.m.   While it is unlikely this will inspire families to gather around their computers as they gathered around their radios to listen to breaking news decades ago, more than a few employers with operations in California may want to listen to this oral argument on a critical issue that affects all such employers – whether employee meal and rest breaks must be “ensured” or merely made “available.”

If the California Supreme Court rules that meal and rest breaks must be “ensured,” most employers will need to implement new policies and practices the very next day.  And most will be vulnerable to the very type of wage-hour class actions that have besieged California employers for the past decade. 

By Michael Kun, Regina Musolino and Aaron Olsen

Since the Supreme Court’s historic ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, attorneys have debated the scope and impact of the decision.  Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ counsel have argued that the decision was limited to its facts, or to discrimination cases, or to cases involving nationwide claims.  And they have argued that Wal-Mart has no application whatsoever to wage-hour class actions and collective actions.  In only a few words, the Supreme Court may have answered some of these questions.

Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court quietly vacated a $7.7 million award in a wage-hour class action in Chinese Daily News v. Wang, remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Wal-Mart.  While the Supreme Court did not provide any further analysis or guidance, and while the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate ruling cannot be predicted, the vacation order alone would seem to undermine a few of the arguments that many plaintiffs’ counsel have been making since Wal-Mart was decided – particularly that Wal-Mart was limited to its facts and has no application to wage-hour matters.  Simply, if the Supreme Court believed Wal-Mart was not applicable to wage-hour claims, there would have been no reason to vacate Chinese Daily News. 

The history of the Chinese Daily News class action is a long and tortured one that most readers of this blog would have little interest in.  It is a hybrid class action alleging claims under both the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California state law for unpaid overtime wages, meal and rest break violations, wage statement violations and waiting time penalties as to approximately 300 employees working at a single facility.  A California district court certified a class under the FLSA, as well as under both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).  The matter ultimately went to trial, where the class prevailed.  The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's decision to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), but declined to address whether certification was appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).   

Given no guidance from the Supreme Court, it would be pure speculation how the Ninth Circuit will ultimately rule.  However it rules, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand will have an enormous impact upon the defense of wage-hour actions throughout the country.  That impact could be short-lived, though.  However the Ninth Circuit rules, we should not be surprised to see one party seeking to take the ruling up to the Supreme Court.  And the Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit rulings in approximately 80% of the Ninth Circuit cases it hears.